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ABSTRACT 
 
The New Zealand Labour Party’s election victory on 14 July 1984 resulted in an official 
rejection of the global strategy of nuclear deterrence.  This action was the most 
fundamental challenge to the defence relationship between New Zealand and the United 
States since the signing of the ANZUS Treaty on 1 September 1951.  This thesis is 
concerned with the effect of Prime Minister David Lange’s personality on the resulting 
dispute between the two nations.  This qualitative study utilises a theoretical framework 
articulated by Margaret G. Hermann which seeks to demonstrate the relationship between 
the idiosyncratic characteristics of leaders and the foreign policy behaviour of their 
respective nations.   
 
In order to effectively conduct this study, a number of key individuals involved in various 
aspects of the ANZUS dispute were interviewed by this author.  It should be noted that 
David Lange was seriously ill throughout the course of this study and was unable to be 
interviewed by the author.  Sir Geoffrey Palmer declined to be interviewed for this study. 
 
Following the introductory chapter of this study, a review of the literature concerned with 
the analysis of leadership and personality is undertaken.  The powers of the Prime 
Minister in the New Zealand political system are examined as are the events surrounding 
the execution of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS dispute.  This thesis 
then assesses the effect of Lange’s personality on the dispute through an examination of 
situational factors, and a variety of aspects of his personality. 
 
This thesis finds that Lange’s personality was instrumental in determining the course of 
events in the ANZUS crisis.   Furthermore, this study concludes that Hermann’s 
theoretical framework is a useful tool in determining the effect of a leader’s personality 
on a particular foreign policy outcome.     
   v
 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One may ask whether personality is truly an important determinant of decisions when a 
political leader is acting in their official capacity.  Indeed, what difference does a leader 
make?  This question has long fascinated scholars, not just in political science proper, but 
also in history and literature.  It has been argued that “the analysis of personality does 
shed light on the actions of key politicians and in this way contrasts with so much of the 
political science discipline, which seems to have little practical relevance to the “real 
world” of politics”.1   
 
Political leadership is recognised as being an integral element of the political process.  
Political theorist, Jean Blondel, observed: 
If one reduces politics to its bare bones, to what is most visible to most citizens, it is the national 
political leaders, both at home and abroad that remain once everything else has been erased, they are the 
most universal, the most recognized, the most talked about elements of political life.2 
 
Moreover, foreign policy is arguably the policy field most likely to be influenced by the 
personalities of leaders.  A nation’s foreign policy is often viewed in terms of the 
personalities of its leaders.  Indeed, one is immediately able to recall examples of 
political events that were critically dependent upon the personalities of key individuals.  
Political theorist, Fred Greenstein, stated: 
                                                 
1 J. Henderson, “Predicting the Performance of Leaders in Parliamentary Systems: New Zealand Prime 
Minister David Lange”, in Profiling Political Leaders: Cross-Cultural Studies of Personality and 
Behaviour, eds. O. Feldman and L. O. Valenty (Westport, U.S.A, 2001), p.204 
2 J. Blondel, Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis (London; Beverly Hills, 1987), p.1 
1 
 Harry Truman, not some abstract commander in chief, authorized the use of the atom bomb; Lyndon 
Johnson, not the impersonal forces of the Cold War, authorized the transformation of the advisory 
mission in South Vietnam into a full-scale military intervention. 
 
Investigations into the effect of the personalities of American presidents on United States 
foreign policy abound.  However, the study of New Zealand political leadership is 
lacking.  Accordingly, this thesis will seek to assess the impact of a New Zealand prime 
minister’s personality on a particular foreign policy executed by his respective 
Government.  To effectively conduct this case study, the political leadership theory 
formulated by Margaret G. Hermann3 will be utilised.   
 
David Lange, as Prime Minister of the Fourth Labour Government, is remembered for his 
role in securing a nuclear-free future for New Zealand.  This thesis will assess the effect 
of David Lange’s personality on the ANZUS crisis that unfolded following the election of 
the Fourth Labour Government in July 1984 and the implementation of its anti-nuclear 
policy.  Lange’s term as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1984-1987, 
constitutes the timeframe for this study. 
 
The rationale for Lange’s selection for this thesis is twofold.  First, he led the New 
Zealand Government at the point in time where New Zealand, without precedent, defied 
the wishes of the United States – the world’s hegemonic power.  Second, the policy 
executed by Lange’s government was in direct opposition to that of her closest ally – 
Australia.  New Zealand and Australia share almost identical views on a wide range of 
foreign policy questions – the ANZUS crisis is perhaps the largest aberration.  Indeed, the 
                                                 
3 M. G. Hermann, “Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy”, in Why 
Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, eds. M. A. East and S. A. 
Salmore (Beverly Hills, 1978) 
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 anti-nuclear policy is arguably the most radical foreign policy in New Zealand’s political 
history; it still stands today.  Therefore, those leadership factors that affected its 
implementation deserve investigation. 
     
A review of the literature pertinent to a study of this nature is undertaken in Chapter 2.  
Furthermore, the contribution this thesis will make to the field of personality and political 
leadership is identified.  Subsequent to this discussion, Chapter 3 analyses the theoretical 
framework that forms the foundation of this thesis.  The three distinct sections of 
Margaret G. Hermann’s model and those variables which comprise each section are 
examined in detail.  Chapter 4 will discuss the powers of the Prime Minister and how 
these impact on the foreign policy process.  This will define further the political context 
within which Lange was operating.  The foreign policy behaviour that constitutes the 
basis for this study is identified in Chapter 5: the anti-nuclear policy of Lange’s 
Government and the subsequent ANZUS crisis are examined.  Chapter 6 marks the first 
chapter to apply Hermann’s framework to the Lange case study.  It applies the first 
category of the model, which is concerned with situational factors, to Lange.  The second 
section of Hermann’s framework is applied to Lange in Chapter 7, discussing aspects of 
his personality in detail.  Chapter 8 pertains to the last category of Hermann’s framework, 
analysing particular personal characteristics of Lange, which Hermann considers to be 
critical to the assessment of personality and political leadership.  The concluding chapter 
of this thesis, Chapter 9, summarises the findings of the case study and comments on the 
utility of Hermann’s theoretical framework for conducting a study of this nature. 
 
   3
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The personality of key, official decision makers is argued to be a key determinant of their 
decisions and, hence, of their nation’s foreign policy.  Politics is a matter of human 
behaviour. Behaviour is defined by both the environmental situations in which actors find 
themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to those situations.4 
Therefore, no analysis of political behaviour can be complete without an examination of 
the political actor who is the agent of that behaviour. 
  
It should in no way be assumed, however, that personality is the sole determinant of 
political leaders’ decision-making.  One foreign policy analyst, James N. Rosenau, 
constructed a pre-theory of foreign policy in which five sets of variables underlying the 
external behaviour of societies are ranked according to their relative potencies in eight 
different types of societies.5  The five sets of variables which form the core of this theory 
are: 
• Systemic:  any non-human aspects of a society’s external environment or any 
actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices 
made by its officials.  For example, geographic “realities” and ideological 
challenges from potential aggressors. 
                                                 
4 F. I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization 
(Chicago, 1969), p. 7 
5 J. N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York, 1971)  
   4
 • Societal: those non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its 
external behaviour.  For example, public opinion. 
• Governmental: those aspects of a government’s structure that limit or enhance 
the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers. 
• Role: the external behaviour of officials that is generated by the roles they 
occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the individual 
characteristics of the role occupants. 
• Individual: the characteristics unique to the decision-makers who determine 
and implement the foreign policies of a nation. 
 
Rosenau contends that a society’s characteristics will determine which of these variables 
is the most important influence on that society’s external behaviour.  For example, 
Rosenau asserts that the foreign policy behaviour of a small, developed state, with an 
open economy (such as New Zealand) will be most affected by the role of the decision 
maker in question.  Following this line of reasoning, New Zealand’s foreign policy 
behaviour would follow the same path regardless of the particular individual decision-
maker, as long as they occupied the same official position, for example, the prime 
ministership.  Rosenau does take into account the idiosyncrasies of the individual 
political leader but, in the view of this author, does not accord it sufficient importance.    
The personalities of political leaders have long fascinated scholars not just of political 
science proper, but also of history and literature.  There is a certain fascination in 
analysing political leaders.  Whether or not a political leader’s personality affects political 
behaviour has been debated through the ages, for example in Plato’s Statesman and in 
   5
 Machiavelli’s Prince.   The debate rests on a number of issues, not the least of which is 
the centuries old “great man” versus “zeitgeist” dilemma: Will a man be a great leader 
regardless of the times, or must the times be right for the man?   
 
The brief interpretation of an 1863 dream of Bismarck by the psychoanalyst Hans Sachs 
in 1913 was perhaps the first attempt to relate a leader’s foreign policy to personality 
factors.6  However, the first sustained analyses of personality and foreign policy 
concerned former United States President Woodrow Wilson.  Three studies were 
undertaken - the earliest is by Freud and Bullit7 (published in 1967, though substantially 
completed by 1932), followed by later works of George and George8  in 1956 and 
Weinstein9 in 1981. 
 
A number of theorists have explored this salient issue as to whether an individual’s 
personality can have a critical impact on political behaviour.  Indeed, some intellectuals 
assert that a leader’s personal characteristics are subsidiary to the formation of foreign 
policy.  Theoretical frameworks have been developed in order to analyse the extent to 
which political actors personalities affect the foreign policies of their respective states.  
The most widely used framework has been operational code analysis.  Nathan Leites 
                                                 
6 According to Sachs’s interpretation, beneath the political plans of Bismarck to provoke a victorious war 
with Austria in the pursuit of German unification were unconscious fantasies of infantile masturbation, 
erotic victories, and identification with the biblical Moses – D. G. Winter, “Personality and Foreign Policy: 
Historical Overview”, in Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, eds. E. Singer and V. Hudson (Boulder, 
1992), p.80 
7 S. Freud and W. C. Bullit, Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A psychological study (Boston, 1967) 
8 A. George and J. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, A Personality Study, (New York, 1956.  
The Georges’ key assertion is that Woodrow Wilson’s life was affected by an unconscious effort to solve 
his repressed problem with his father.  Accordingly, Wilson kept having to prove himself (and his father) 
that he was worthy of love.  He kept striving for greater achievement and power.  Wilson was also 
exceedingly dependent on the approval and love of friends. 
9 E. A. Weinstein, Woodrow Wilson: A medical and psychological biography (Princeton, 1981) 
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 introduced the operational code construct into the domain of political psychology in his 
classic work, The Operational Code of the Politburo.10  Alexander George reformulated 
the framework in 1969 in a way that has provided the framework for all subsequent 
research.11  Operational code analysis proceeds from a simple set of ten questions which 
seek to ascertain an actor’s ‘beliefs’.  Moreover, it is composed of two types of beliefs - 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs.  Philosophical beliefs refer to a political leader’s 
“fundamental assumptions” about the nature of politics (e.g. their belief about the role of 
chance in political events); instrumental beliefs characterise the leader’s beliefs about 
strategies and styles appropriate to acting in a political world defined by their 
philosophical beliefs (e.g. risk-taking preferences).  George describes the operational 
code of a leader as: “A political leader’s beliefs about the nature of politics and political 
conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, 
and his notions of correct strategy and tactics.”12  The operational code model has been 
further refined by Holsti13 and Walker14. 
 
James David Barber also regards the study of the personal characteristics of leaders as 
being crucial in accounting, at least in part, for the impact of leaders and for the nature of 
this impact.  Barber’s work The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the 
                                                 
10 N. Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York, 1951).   
11 A. George “The “operational code”: A neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-
making”, International Studies Quarterly 13 (1969) 
12 ibid, p. 197 
13 O. Holsti, “The “operational code” as an approach to the analysis of belief systems”, Final Report to the 
National Science Foundation, Grant SOC 75-15368 (Durham, 1977) 
14 S. G. Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis”, Political Psychology 11:2 (1990); “The 
motivational foundations of belief systems: A reanalysis of the operational code construct”, International 
Studies Quarterly 27 (1983) 
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 White House15 provided another significant contribution to the field of political 
psychology and has provided the framework for a number of case studies of United States 
Presidents.16  In describing the behaviour of presidents in detail, Barber demonstrated 
that actions follow character and therefore character matters.   
                                                
Furthermore, Barber sought to elaborate a psychological classification which would 
enable scholars to predict the performance of United States Presidents.  The model is 
based on two simple questions relating to a leader’s participation: how much energy or 
activity they devote to politics and how they regard their political life.  The answers to 
these questions on activity and affect allow a leader to be categorised into one of four 
character types: active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive and passive-negative.  
Barber contends that with each of the four types of personality goes a certain pattern of 
behaviour which enables one to predict the performance of a political actor.  He seeks to 
demonstrate that it is in childhood that a leader’s presidential character is established, in 
adolescence their worldview, and in their early political successes their political style.  
Furthermore, it is contended that an individual’s participation in politics and their feelings 
about their political life are the central features of anyone’s “orientation to life”, and is 
accordingly central to understanding the personality of politicians.17 
 
Similarly Margaret G. Hermann asserts that a political leader's view of the world and 
their personal political style can influence their government's strategies and styles of 
 
15 J. D. Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (3rd ed.), (New 
Jersey, 1985) 
16 For example, J. Henderson, “Predicting the Performance of Leaders in Parliamentary Systems: New 
Zealand Prime Minister David Lange”, in Profiling Political Leaders: Cross-Cultural Studies of 
Personality and Behaviour, eds. O. Feldman and L. O. Valenty, (Westport, U.S,A, 2001)  
17 Barber, p.7 
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 foreign policy behaviour.18  She seeks to demonstrate that a leader's interest in foreign 
affairs, their training in foreign affairs and their sensitivity to their environment affect the 
magnitude of the relationships between these personal characteristics and foreign policy 
behaviour. Hermann has applied this model in an intensive study of twelve leaders from 
sub-Saharan Africa19 as well as in three individual case studies of United States 
Presidents Reagan20 and Bush21 and Soviet President Gorbachev22.   
  
The theory that a political leader’s personality can have a significant effect on their 
nations foreign policy behaviour is not without is critics.  Hermann has noted three main 
arguments propounded against the case for the importance of personality to political 
behaviour.23  First, individual actors are limited by social forces in the impact they can 
have on events.  The international system so shapes and constrains policy that individual 
decision makers can have minimal impact.  Second, critics state that in the foreign policy 
arena leaders who have different personal characteristics behave similarly in common 
situations.  Whilst names may change policies do not.  Third, it is argued that 
organisational constraints limit the effect of individual characteristics as foreign policy 
choices are made in complex bureaucracies.    
 
                                                 
18 M. G. Hermann, “Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy”, in Why 
Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, eds. M. A. East and S. A. 
Salmore (Beverly Hills, 1978) 
19 M. G. Hermann, “Assessing the foreign policy role orientations of Sub-Saharan African leaders”, in Role 
Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. S. G. Walker (Durham, 1987) 
20 M. G. Hermann, “Assessing personality at a distance: A profile of Ronald Reagan”, Mershon Center 
Quarterly Report (Ohio State University) 7 (1983) 
21 M. G. Hermann, “Defining the Bush presidential style”, Mershon Memo (Ohio State University) (Spring 
1989) 
22 M. G. Hermann, “Personality profile data on Gorbachev”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association held in London, March 1989 
23 Hermann (1978), p.50 
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 One proponent of the view that personality does affect on political behaviour, Richard 
Lazarus, has asserted: 
The sources of man’s behaviour (his observable action) and his subjective experience (such as thoughts, 
feelings, and wishes) are twofold: the external stimuli that impinge on him and the internal dispositions 
that result from the interaction between inherited physiological characteristics and experience with the 
world…It is evident that a man’s behaviour varies greatly, from circumstance to circumstance, changing 
with the changing conditions to which he is exposed. 
  
Still, even as we recognize the dependency of behaviour on outside stimuli, we are also aware that it 
cannot be accounted for on the basis of the external stimuli alone, but that in fact it must arise partly 
from personal characteristics.24  
 
Political theorist Fred Greenstein has made some observations about the United States’ 
political system that may be well applied to other political systems, indeed to this thesis’ 
case study.  He has stated that it is a common misperception to regard the United States’ 
political system as one of laws and institutions rather than individuals:  
For better or worse, the personalities of presidents are as integral a part of the American political 
system as the constitutionally mandated instruments of government and are equally in need of close 
and continuing attention.25  
Another school of thought maintains that different types of leaders are required for 
different kinds of situations.26  An individual’s personal characteristics may only allow 
them to cope with certain types of situations.  Hermann notes that a leader in one 
situation is not necessarily a successful leader in another.27  Indeed, Churchill and de 
                                                 
24 R. Lazarus, Personality and Adjustment (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), p. 27-28 
25 F. I. Greenstein, “Foreword”, in Presidential Personality and Performance, A. L. George and J. L. 
George (Boulder, 1998), p. ix 
26 J. Blondel, Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis (London; Beverly Hills, 1987), p. 134 
27 Hermann (1978), p. 51 
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 Gaulle had to wait for situations in which saviours were required before they could truly 
be recognised and make a major impact on their societies.28  
Similarly, Greenstein suggests that a leader’s personality may be particularly important 
under four conditions: when the actor occupies a strategic location; when the situation is 
ambiguous or unstable, when there are no clear precedents or routine role requirements; 
and when spontaneous or particularly effortful behaviour is required.29  It can be well 
argued that these conditions are most often met in the arena of foreign policy.      
What personal characteristics are most likely to affect political behaviour is another point 
on which scholarly opinion differs.  A facet of this debate is concerned with the 
distinction between a leader’s “personality” and a leader’s “personal characteristics”.  
Indeed, there is disagreement as to what constitutes “personality”.  As Greenstein notes, 
“[t]here are differences within psychology over what is meant by “personality” and, 
furthermore, the term tends to have different connotations to political scientists than it has 
to psychologists.”30  Indeed, Allport in his Personality: A Psychological Interpretation31  
noted some fifty different definitions of personality.   
However, the uncertainty of this term has not discouraged some scholars from venturing 
a definition.  A number of psychologists have described individual personalities in terms 
of functions that are common to all people.  George Kelly has suggested that each 
individual should be understood in terms of the dimensions of the world they create about 
                                                 
28 Blondel, p. 134 
29 Greenstein (1969) 
30 ibid, p. 129 
31 G. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York, 1937) 
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 them.32  Gordon DiRenzo asserts “[p]ersonality may be defined fundamentally as 
follows: one’s acquired, relatively enduring, yet dynamic, unique system of 
predispositions to psychological and social behaviour.”33  
Other scholars are not prepared to use a somewhat ambiguous term and thus refer to a 
leader’s “personal characteristics” in order to avoid misunderstandings.  Hermann is one 
such scholar.  She defines personal characteristics as being all aspects of an individual 
qua individual – their biographical statistics, training, work experiences, personality 
traits, beliefs, attitudes, and values.34  In her chapter in Why Nations Act: Theoretical 
Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, Hermann categorises these 
personal characteristics into four distinct groups: beliefs, motives, decision style and 
interpersonal style.  The relationships between these four characteristics are influenced by 
a leader’s interest in foreign affairs, their training or expertise in foreign affairs and their 
sensitivity to their environment.  Hermann, however, has been criticised for failing to 
include intelligence and emotionality in her model.35  
Joseph de Rivera also considers the many facets that comprise a decision-maker’s 
personality.  For example, a decision-maker’s various preferences (such as low risk 
taking), abilities, problems (such as an anger management), and his general style are 
considered.36  Indeed, de Rivera notes “[t]here are so many preferences, abilities, rules, 
                                                 
32 G. Kelly, The Psychology of Personal Constructs (New York, 1955) 
33 G. J. DiRenzo, Personality and Politics (New York, 1974), p. 16 
34 Hermann (1978), p.64 
35 Blondel, p.133 
36 J. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, 1968), p. 166 
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 and styles that it is difficult to know how to describe the behaviour of a decision maker 
with some economy.”37  
De Rivera also notes a number of different approaches to measuring personality 
developed by psychologists.  These are divided into three major categories: the 
nomethetic approach, the ideographic approach and the phenomenal approach.38  The 
“nomethetic” approach may be divided into the “operational”, the “conceptual” and the 
“complex description” approaches.   Both the operational and conceptual approaches 
involve the investigator working with one personality variable that interests them, such as 
the need to achieve or the need for approval.  In contrast the complex description 
approach works to describe individuals in terms of many variables.  De Rivera notes that 
using these methods, psychologists have created a barrage of tests that describe various 
aspects of personality and may be used to predict decision-making behaviour.39  
However, this author contends that a skilful biography rather than a bombardment of 
personality tests may prove to be a more accurate portrayal of an individual’s personality.   
Secondly, the “ideographic” approach begins with the individual, describes his life as a 
series of responses, investigates the pattern and then categorises it.  Like the nomethetic 
approach, the ideographic approach examines the person “externally” and uses 
descriptive labels to type rather than understand their behaviour. 
                                                 
37 ibid, p.167 
38 ibid, p.168 
39 ibid, p.181 
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 Lastly, the “phenomenal” approach describes the situation the individual is in and the 
decisions they make from a subjective stand-point in an attempt to assess the individual’s 
personality.     
Theoretical studies of the personalities of New Zealand prime ministers 
Much of the literature linking personality to foreign policy decision making has focused 
on American presidents.  Little scholarly attention has been given to the effect of the 
personalities of leaders of parliamentary systems on the foreign policies of their 
governments.  Moreover, the effect of the personalities of New Zealand political leaders 
on New Zealand foreign policy is much neglected in the field of political science.  Only a 
handful of studies have been undertaken which utilised theoretical frameworks to assess 
the impact of leaders’ personalities on the New Zealand political process.40  John 
Henderson, former Director of the Advisory Group and then the Prime Minister’s Office 
under David Lange, utilised Barber’s framework in order to assess the impact of Lange’s 
personality on the political process.41  After applying Barber’s typology, Henderson 
characterised Lange as a “passive-positive”.  Lange is shown to have been motivated by 
the drama of politics and the lure of the political stage on which he could win the 
affection and approval of others.42   
 
                                                 
40 D. R. Davis, “The Operational Code of Bruce Craig Beetham”, Political Science, 32:1 (July 1980); J. 
Henderson, “The ‘Operational Code’ of Robert David Muldoon”, Politics in New Zealand: a reader, ed. S. 
Levine (Sydney, 1978); J. Henderson, “Labour’s Modern Prime Ministers and the Party: A Study of 
Contrasting Political Styles”, in The Labour Party after 75 Years, ed. M. Clark (Wellington,1992) and 
“Predicting the Performance of Leaders in Parliamentary Systems: New Zealand Prime Minister David 
Lange”, in Profiling Political Leaders: Cross-Cultural Studies of Personality and Behaviour, eds. O. 
Feldman and L. O. Valenty (Westport, U.S.A, 2001); J. Johansson, Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and 
Leadership, (Wellington, 2005)   
41 Henderson (1992), (2001) 
42 Henderson( 2001), p.209 
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 New Zealand political scientist, Jon Johansson, has also analysed Lange’s political 
leadership style.43  Johansson utilised Erwin Hargrove’s model of presidential leadership 
to assess the prime-ministerial leaderships of both Robert Muldoon and David Lange.44  
Johansson asserts that Lange, whilst being a master of rhetorical leadership, was 
ultimately let down by his lack of bargaining skill and his problematic interpersonal 
relations.45  With regards to the ANZUS crisis, Johansson notes that Lange “defended 
and developed the [anti-nuclear] issue in a way that none of his colleagues, or any of 
many opponents, could have matched.”
his 
                                                
46   
 
Conclusion 
As has been demonstrated, there are a number of different theories regarding the effect 
political leaders’ personalities can have on the formulation and execution of foreign 
policy, all of which stem from a plethora of contrasting opinions.  Different theorists 
emphasise different factors.  However, there does appear to be a prima facie valid 
argument that the personality of political leaders is an important component of the foreign 
policy process.  This thesis will utilise Margaret Hermann’s model47 to analyse a case 
study and thus determine the extent to which a leader’s personality affects the 
formulation and execution of foreign policy.  This will also allow Hermann’s framework 
to be tested and the utility of the model revealed. 
 
 
43 J. Johansson, Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership, (Wellington, 2005) 
44 Erwin’s model has three major components: a leader applying their strategy and skill in context; cultural 
leadership; and teaching reality. 
45 ibid, p.214 
46 ibid, p.150 
47 Hermann (1978) 
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 The need for further, in-depth studies of New Zealand political leadership has also been 
demonstrated.  Whilst a handful of analyses of New Zealand prime ministers have been 
undertaken, to this author’s knowledge no theoretical studies have been undertaken 
linking  a New Zealand prime minister’s personality to a particular foreign policy 
outcome.  Given the abundance of scholarly material that has been produced on 
American presidential leadership, the need for such a study is all the more acute.  
Accordingly, this thesis will assess the effect of David Lange’s personality on the 
ANZUS crisis during his term as New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs – 1984-1987.  
 
In the following chapter, Margaret Hermann’s theoretical framework will be examined in 
detail.  The three components of her model will be analysed: the nature of the situation in 
which the leader finds themselves, the first set of personal characteristics of the 
leader(beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style) and the second set of 
personal characteristics, which Hermann labels “filters”, (interest in foreign affairs, 
training in foreign affairs and sensitivity to environment).  The rationale for the use of 
Hermann’s model for this thesis will also be discussed. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
 
HERMANN’S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Margaret G. Hermann is a leading scholar in the study of the effect of personality and 
leadership style on national foreign policy behaviour through the decision-making 
process.  Hermann has articulated a theory and produced a number of empirical studies 
which explore the ways in which leadership styles differ within similar political 
settings.48  The personal characteristics of political actors, which give rise to their 
personal political styles, are regarded as having a fundamental effect on the foreign 
policy implemented by their respective countries.   
 
In her chapter “Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy” 
in Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies49, 
Herman constructs a theoretical framework in which to answer the question: How do the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of political leaders affect their governments’ foreign policy 
behaviour?  She argues strongly that personal characteristics of leaders can affect what 
actions governments take in the international arena.50  Hermann divides her theory into 
three distinct sections.  First, the nature of the situation in which a political leader finds 
themself is analysed.  Hermann asserts that the likelihood of finding a relationship 
                                                 
48 M. G. Hermann, “Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy”, in Why 
Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, eds. M. A. East, S. A. 
Salmore, C. F. Hermann (Beverly Hills, 1978); “Assessing personality at a distance: A profile of Ronald 
Reagan”, Mershon Center Quarterly Report (Ohio State University) 7 (1983); “Assessing the foreign policy 
role orientations of Sub-Saharan African leaders”, in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. S. G. 
Walker (Durham, 1987); “Defining the Bush presidential style”, Mershon Memo (Ohio State University) 
(Spring 1989); “Personality profile data on Gorbachev”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association held in London, March 1989 
49 Hermann (1978)  
50 ibid, p.49 
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 between a leader’s personal characteristics and their government’s foreign policy 
behaviour are enhanced if the situation facing the government is taken into account.51   
Second, the personal characteristics of a leader are examined.  Hermann argues that 
personal characteristics of political leaders will have a larger influence on national 
foreign policy if they hold high-level positions.52  Hermann gives the example of heads 
of state meeting this criterion. 
                                                
 
Third, the theory analyses a second set of personal characteristics, which Hermann labels 
“filters”.  The “filters’ are features which affect the degree to which a leader’s personal 
characteristics can have an impact on national foreign policy.  These three characteristics 
are: a leader’s interest in foreign affairs, their training in foreign affairs, and their general 
sensitivity to the political environment.53  This chapter will analyse Hermann’s 
framework and comment on the utility of its application for the case study in question. 
 
Nature of the Situation 
The situation in which a leader finds themself is widely acknowledged to be of great 
importance when examining the effect of a leader’s personality on the policy-making 
process.  Indeed, Joseph de Rivera has argued that “the very importance of the 
individual’s personality depends on the situation he finds himself in.” 54  Following 
Hermann’s analysis, this variable is comprised simply of three types of conditions which 
give rise to circumstances which enable a leader’s personal characteristics to have more 
 
51 ibid 
52 ibid 
53 ibid 
54 J. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, 1968), p.198 
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 impact on foreign policy.  First, situations in which the political leader has wide-decision 
latitude give more scope for influence.  Hermann gives the example of the “honeymoon” 
period following a landslide election.55  It can be well argued that new leaders are 
afforded a certain ‘capital’, based on possibly popularity or fear, which places them in a 
better position to achieve policy changes or impose their will.  Secondly, leaders’ 
personal characteristics have more impact in situations that compel the political leader to 
define or interpret them.  An ambiguous situation is one example that meets this 
condition.  Lastly, personal characteristics will have more impact on foreign policy in 
situations in which the political leader is likely to participate in the decision-making 
process.  Times of crises are an example of this.       
 
Other theorists have outlined the situational factors believed to have a bearing upon the 
effect of a leader’s personality.  Fred Greenstein has suggested that a leader’s personality 
may be particularly important under four conditions: (a) when the political actor occupies 
a strategic location, such as Prime Minister, (b) when the situation is ambiguous or 
unstable, (c) when there are no clear precedent or routine requirements and, (d) when 
spontaneous or particularly effortful behaviour is required.56  Foreign policy is arguably 
the field in which these conditions are most often met.    
 
Blondel has also articulated the importance of situational factors when analysing the 
influence of a leader’s personality.  He argues that different leaders are appropriate to 
                                                 
55 Hermann, p.52 
56 F. I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of evidence, inference and conceptualization  
(Chicago,1969), p.46 
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 different kinds of situations.57  “However endowed an individual may be with ‘leadership 
qualities’ he may be able to cope with only some types of situations and not with all.”58  
Therefore, it is well argued that the effect of a leader’s personality is, to a significant 
extent, dependent upon the situation in which they find themself.    
 
Personal Characteristics: beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style 
Hermann asserts that the four types of personal characteristics that appear most relevant 
to foreign policy making are a political leader’s beliefs, motives, decision style, and 
interpersonal style.59  By ‘relevant’ Hermann means “that variables from these clusters of 
traits have often been described as important, idiosyncratic determinants of political 
behaviour.”60  A leader’s beliefs and motives form their view of the world and their 
decision-style and interpersonal style comprise their personal political style.    
 
Beliefs under Hermann’s model are regarded as mirroring the philosophical beliefs of the 
operational code.  As noted in chapter 1, these beliefs entail a leader’s fundamental 
assumptions about the world.  Hermann notes that such beliefs can range from being very 
general, such as a political leader’s notions about their ability to control events in their 
life, to quite specific, such as a leader’s notions about their ability to shape political 
events for their nation.61   
 
                                                 
57 J. Blondel, Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis (London; Beverly Hills, 1987), p.134 
58 ibid 
59 Hermann, p.59 
60 ibid 
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 A political leader’s motives refer to the reasons for their actions: “the desires that activate 
them.”62  This feature is similar to Barber’s  model which categorises a leader into one of 
four character types based on their underlying motivation for engaging in the political 
machine.63  Power, achievement, duty and affection are the four fundamental motivations 
found in Barber’s leadership framework.  The desire for power has often been discussed 
as a driving force behind a political actor.  Hermann also notes that other motives that 
may be relevant to the policy-making process are: the need to be independent and the 
need for structure.64 
 
Decision style is defined as a leader’s preferred methods of making decisions.  Hermann 
posits the following question as a means of assessing a leader’s decision style: Can we 
discern certain ways of approaching a decision-making task that characterise the political 
leader?  Synder and Robinson suggest that decision style is comprised of the following 
five factors: “(a) confidence, (b) openness to new information, (c) preference for certain 
levels of risk and sizes of stake, (d) capacity for postponing decision without anxiety, and 
(e) rules for adjusting to uncertainty.” 65  Decision style is viewed as similar to the 
instrumental beliefs found in the operational code as articulated by George, which 
represent a leader’s beliefs about strategies and styles appropriate to acting in a political 
world defined by their philosophical beliefs.66  Moreover, Barber’s four presidential 
character types are each accompanied by a distinctive decision style: flexibility, 
                                                 
62 ibid 
63 J. D. Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (3rd ed.), (New 
Jersey, 1985) 
64 Hermann, p. 60 
65 R. C. Snyder and J. A. Robinson, National and international decision-making: toward a general 
research strategy related to the problem of war and peace (New York, 1961), p.164 
66 A. George “The “operational code”: A neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-
making”, International Studies Quarterly 13 (1969) 
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 compulsivity, compliance, or withdrawal.  Hermann suggests that other possible 
components of decision style include preference for compromise and preference for 
planning instead of activity.67    
 
Lastly, interpersonal style refers to the “characteristic ways in which a policy maker deals 
with other policy makers.”68  Examples include suspiciousness, paranoia or manipulation 
as means of dealing with others.  Hermann proposes that a leader’s sensitivity to others, 
political timing, and means of persuading are alternative facets of interpersonal style.69 
 
Political theorist, David Winter, is also of the opinion that beliefs, motives and 
interpersonal style are salient to the research of foreign policy behaviour and 
personality.70  In assessing past research into this field, he used three broad headings to 
group three basic elements of personality: 1) motives; 2) cognitions and beliefs; 3) 
temperament and interpersonal traits.  Winter defines motives as being “the different 
classes of goals toward which people direct their behaviour” and notes that power and 
affiliation are the most frequently studied.71  Cognition and beliefs “include specific 
beliefs, attitudes, and values as well as more general cognitive decision-making, and 
interpersonal styles.”72  Third, Winter states that temperament and interpersonal traits 
                                                 
67 Hermann, p.60 
68 ibid 
69 ibid 
70 D. G. Winter, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview of Research”, in Political 
Psychology and Foreign Policy eds. E. Singer and V. Hudson (Boulder, 1992), p.86 
71 ibid 
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 reflect individual differences in energy levels, sociability, impulse control, and emotional 
stability.”73  
 
Having articulated the personal characteristics at issue, Hermann seeks to examine the 
nexus between them and foreign policy behaviour.  She asserts that two aspects of foreign 
policy appear to be affected by a leader’s personal characteristics: (1) the strategies that 
the government employs in its foreign policy, and (2) the styles in which the foreign 
policy is made and executed.74  Foreign policy strategies are defined as “a government’s 
basic plans for action.”75 Adopting a generally cooperative or competitive stance toward 
other nations is an example of such a strategy.  Styles of foreign policy are the methods a 
government uses in formulating and executing its foreign policy, such as the use of 
personal diplomacy and the relative involvement of the bureaucracy in the foreign policy 
process.76  In effect, strategies are concerned with the substance of foreign policy, and 
styles focus on the means of its formulation and execution.  These strategies and styles 
are affected by a leader’s personal characteristics because as a leader’s beliefs and 
motives refer to their interpretation of the environment, they are likely to co-erce their 
government to act in ways consistent with these notions.  
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 “Filters” – personal characteristics: interest in foreign affairs, training in foreign 
affairs and sensitivity to environment   
The final section of Hermann’s framework is labelled “filters”.  This term refers to three 
further personal characteristics which affect the influence of a political leader’s 
personality on foreign policy.  First, Hermann argues that without at least a general 
interest in foreign affairs, a political leader’s personal characteristics will have little 
effect.77  The higher the degree of interest, the higher the degree of attention the leader 
will pay to foreign policy.  An interested leader will ensure they are consulted on 
decisions and kept abreast of developments in foreign affairs.  Indeed, a political leader’s 
rationale for their interest in foreign affairs may predetermine the course of action they 
will follow.  Should a leader have minimal interest in foreign affairs, they will be more 
likely to delegate authority thus negating any influence of their personality on the 
subsequent policy. 
 
Once an interest is established, the leader’s training or expertise in foreign affairs is 
examined.  Hermann views training as entailing experience as a foreign minister, 
ambassador, or foreign affairs official prior to assuming their current office.  The leader 
with no previous experience has no personal expertise to draw upon, ensuring little 
knowledge of what will succeed and fail in the international arena.  With training and/or 
experience comes a wider repertoire of possible foreign policy behaviours to consider.  
Blondel also recognises the importance of a leader’s experience in the foreign policy 
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 process.  He notes that leaders change over time and their ability to act effectively is 
likely to improve at first as a result of better training.78 
 
The third personal characteristic is general sensitivity to one’s environment.  This affects 
“the consistency of the relationship between other characteristics and foreign policy.”79  
Hermann defines sensitivity to one’s environment as indicating “the extent to which an 
individual is responsive to incoming stimuli from objects in the milieu in which he 
operates.”80  The less sensitive political leader will adjust incoming stimuli to conform to 
their viewpoint, whilst the more sensitive political leader will adjust their views if 
incoming stimuli warrant such an adjustment.    
 
Further qualitative research into personality, leadership styles and foreign policy 
behaviour undertaken by Hermann 
Since publishing this theoretical model, Hermann has continued to analyse the effect of 
personality and leadership style on foreign policy behaviour.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
Hermann has applied this framework in an intensive study of twelve leaders from sub-
Saharan Africa81 as well as in three individual case studies of United States Presidents 
Reagan82 and Bush83 and Soviet President Gorbachev84.  Moreover, Hermann has 
                                                 
78 Blondel, p.142 
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 conducted further examinations of the variables pertinent to the study of personality and 
foreign policy behaviour.   
 
In 1994, Hermann and J. T. Preston produced an analysis of advisory systems which 
included a review of the various studies of presidential leadership style.85  From these 
studies they derived five common leadership style variables: involvement in the policy-
making process, willingness to tolerate conflict, motivation for leading, preferred 
strategies for managing information and preferred strategies for resolving conflict.  
Involvement in the policy-making process is “…suggestive of a focus on personal 
engagement in the process and a desire to be a part of what is happening, to be on top of 
problem solving …”86  Associated with this variable is a leader’s interest and experience 
in policy-making in general and certain issue-areas in particular.  A leader’s attitude to 
conflict is reflected in a leader’s willingness to tolerate disharmony among advisors.  A 
leader’s motivation for leading may be rooted in a general ideology, by popular approval, 
or by personal gain.  The fourth and fifth variables, the preferred strategies for managing 
information and resolving conflict refer to how leaders endeavour to structure the 
environment around them.  
 
These five leadership variables, as identified by Hermann and Preston, common to 
leadership and foreign policy behaviour studies, are all present in Hermann’s original 
model.  Involvement in the policy-making process is reflected in the first and third 
categories of Hermann’s original model: nature of the situation and the personal 
                                                 
85 M. G. Hermann and J. T. Preston, “Presidents, advisers, and foreign policy: The effects of leadership 
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 characteristic “filters” of interest and training in foreign policy.  The second and third 
variables, willingness to tolerate conflict and motivation for leading are located in the 
second category of Hermann’s model: beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal 
style.  A leader’s strategies for managing information and for resolving conflict are also 
covered by Hermann’s “sensitivity to environment” found in the “filters” section.  
 
Hermann, in conjunction with political scientist, Juliet Kaarbo, has also produced an 
analysis of the effect of leadership styles of prime ministers on the foreign policy-making 
process.87  Similarly to the Hermann and Preston study, the variables that are posited as 
influencing prime ministers’ political leadership styles are included in Hermann’s model: 
1) a leader’s degree of involvement, which includes their interest and experience in 
foreign policy; 2) a leader’s focus of involvement, which refers to a leader’s motivation 
in the political process; 3) managing information; 4) managing conflict; 5) inclusion of 
other policy makers in the decision making process.  Unlike Hermann’s original model, 
the variables which the authors consider pertinent are not easily discernable, making its 
application somewhat problematic.    
  
Why Hermann’s model?    
Biographies and autobiographies have proven to be the preferred means of analysis of 
political leadership.  Through detailed descriptions it has been shown that the 
personalities of leaders have a large effect on foreign policy behaviour.  However, it has 
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been argued that the link between personal characteristics and impact on foreign policy 
remains vague and obscure.88   
 
A handful of commentators have proposed frameworks which examine the relationship 
between leadership personality and foreign policy behaviour.  However, it has been 
asserted that the role played by individual characteristics in the foreign policy process is 
yet to be demonstrated.89  Blondel suggests that this field of study requires a model, as 
general as possible, which elaborates the different dimensions of the relationship between 
personal characteristics and leadership impact.90  There is scholarly speculation that 
Hermann’s framework does indeed meet this standard.  David Winter has contended that: 
Hermann’s model, combining as it does the interactive effects of eight objectively defined, major 
personality variables with these filters of interests, learning, and situation, reflects some of the 
most sophisticated and advanced trends of modern personality theory and research applied to the 
interpretation and understanding of foreign policy behaviour.91 
 
 
Hermann’s framework is easily comprehended and covers a broad range of factors one 
would consider pertinent to include in such an analysis.   
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 Conclusion 
Hermann’s theoretical framework is comprised of three sections: nature of the situation; 
personal characteristics; and filters.  Included in these sections are a number of variables 
which are pertinent to the study of personality and foreign policy behaviour.  The model 
is also easily understood and jargon-free.  Examination of Hermann’s subsequent 
qualitative research has demonstrated that the variables she considers salient to this field 
of research have not altered.  Accordingly, this author will utilise this model to analyse 
the case study of David Lange and the ANZUS dispute.   
 
As Prime Minister, Lange was afforded a number of political powers.  In order to 
effectively examine the effect of Lange’s personality on the ANZUS dispute, the powers 
he had at his disposal, by virtue of his position, require investigation.  Therefore, in the 
subsequent chapter the powers of the New Zealand Prime Minister in the foreign policy 
process will be investigated. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
THE POWERS OF THE NEW ZEALAND PRIME 
MINISTER IN THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS 
 
In democratic parliamentary governments prime ministers are located at the apex of 
power and as such they are the most powerful individuals in their respective political 
systems.  They are the Head of Government, chief Government spokesperson, leader of 
the governing party, and chairperson of Cabinet and the Government Caucus.   
 
It has been noted that “[p]owerful as the Prime Minister is, he remains the leader of a 
team rather than conductor of an orchestra.”92  Accordingly, the Prime Minister is 
referred to as ‘primus inter pares’ (first among equals).  They are ‘among equals’ because 
in the governmental decision-making process, they are but one member of the decision-
making body.  They are referred to as ‘first’ because they are not only the leader of the 
decision-making body but also are able to decide the composition of the body93 and the 
roles which each member will fulfil.  When discussing the powers of the Prime Minister 
it is crucial that one notes that as the leader of the country, the prime minister has more 
scope to influence affairs of state than any other individual.  The area of foreign affairs is 
subject to such influence.   
 
 
                                                 
92 A. Mitchell, Government by Party: parliament and politics in New Zealand  (Wellington, 1966), p.30 
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 The role of the Prime Minister 
In accordance with New Zealand’s sparse, unwritten constitutional arrangements there 
does not exist an evident statement of the formal powers of the Prime Minister.  Political 
scientist, Roderic Alley has noted:  
“[i]n every other respect, New Zealand has followed the British tradition that the Prime Minister is not 
known to the law as an officer of the state to which specific legal powers are attached…Nevertheless, 
the key conventions prescribing the Prime Minister’s core constitutional role are clear and 
unambiguous: as head of the party in Parliament maintaining the confidence of the House, the Prime 
Minister leads the Ministry which, in formal terms at least, tenders advice to the Crown through the 
Executive Council.”94   
 
As has been noted above, depending on their respective parties’s rules, the Prime 
Minister may determine the composition95 of Cabinet and the allocation of portfolios.  
This enables them to determine where influence will lie.  Ministers are all too aware that 
it is the Prime Minster who can control their political advancement and future political 
careers.  With regard to the execution of foreign policy, these powers provide the Prime 
Minister with significant influence.  She or he is able to allocate the Foreign Affairs 
portfolio to either themselves or a like-minded colleague, thus ensuring their agenda is 
satisfied.  
 
The Prime Minister can also advise the Governor-General to dissolve the House of 
Representatives at any time and hold a general election.  Such a step was taken before the 
customary election time in 1951 and 1984.  However, given that elections much be held 
                                                 
94 R. Alley, “The Powers of the Prime Minister”, in  New Zealand Politics in Perspective, ed. H. Gold, 
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 every three years in New Zealand, the possibility of holding an early election is not of 
fundamental importance to prime ministerial power.    
 
As Chairperson of Cabinet and caucus, the Prime Minister’s opinion will carry weight on 
all issues.  Hence, this role is of critical importance.  The Prime Minister is afforded 
considerable power through their ability to determine the agenda and to sum up the 
decisions of Cabinet and caucus.   
 
“Cabinet is the central decision-making body of Executive Government.”96  Palmer and 
Palmer have observed that “[a]n incredible amount of decision-making power is 
concentrated in the New Zealand Cabinet.”97  Ultimately, Cabinet has final determination 
of New Zealand’s foreign relations.  Included in this are: the conclusion of treaties, acts 
of peace to acts of war, and the formalising of trade agreements.  G.A. Wood has stated: 
“It is through domination of Cabinet, with all its powers and functions, that strong Prime 
Ministers can assert their will.  It is through Cabinet’s close liaison with the governing 
party in Parliament that the Prime Minister heads the supreme law-making authority.”98  
Therefore, Wood concludes: “Political control over the organs of Government, the 
prestige of Cabinet and the power of Parliament are the bases of prime ministerial power, 
and consequently they implicitly uphold them.”99  Following this logic, one may 
conclude that the Prime Minister will impose their preferences, with respect to foreign 
affairs, on Cabinet and Parliament.   
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 A further important function of the Prime Minister is to be the Government’s chief 
spokesperson.  This entails presenting the Government’s position on key matters to 
Parliament and the public by way of the media.  Patrick Weller has noted: “Since the 
media concentrate on the figure at the top, prime ministers can use that attention for their 
own purposes.”100  Furthermore, Former Director of the Advisory Group and then Head 
of the Prime Minister’s Office under David Lange, John Henderson, has commented: 
“The prime minister’s statements are taken by the media to be the authoritative view of 
government, which gives the prime minister considerable potential power to commit the 
government to a course of action even without Cabinet approval.”101  Therefore, it can be 
argued that, in matters of foreign affairs, the Prime Minister may unilaterally alter the 
direction of the country’s international relations.   
 
As Head of Government, the Prime Minister is reliant upon the stability of their 
government in order to maintain their position.  As such, the Prime Minister is concerned 
with all matters and events that affect the general health of the government.  Former New 
Zealand Prime Minister, Sir Keith Holyoake, observed that “the Prime Minister must 
maintain a fatherly oversight over the progress of his Cabinet colleagues, particularly in 
their work of implementing policy.”102   
 
The Prime Minister is also able to play a direct role in the making of diplomatic 
appointments, such as ambassadorial posts.  Alley has observed there is a general 
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 presumption that if the Prime Minister seeks to influence an appointment then this will 
happen.103  The ability to influence which individuals represent New Zealand’s opinion 
on international matters in cities such as London, Washington D.C. and Canberra is a 
significant power; one which allows him or her to affect the foreign policy process.  
 
As Minister in charge of the Security Intelligence Service, the New Zealand Prime 
Minister has an important function to perform in furtherance of New Zealand’s security.  
The SIS is empowered to investigate terrorism, subversion and espionage; all vital 
aspects of New Zealand’s foreign policy.  Accordingly, as Minister of this particular 
portfolio, the Prime Minister is privy to examination of matters of national security.     
 
Has the office of Prime Minister become “presidentialised”? 
The question of how powerful prime ministers are is of fundamental importance.  When 
examining the powers of the Prime Minister, one should have regard to the often cited 
argument that the political system has changed from one of cabinet government to prime 
ministerial government.104  In other words, the office of Prime Minister has been 
“presidentialised”.  Illustrative of this point, Alley notes a piece of paper Sir Robert 
Muldoon referred to at a news conference in March 1984 on the occasion of his retiring 
Deputy, Duncan McIntyre’s, departure.  On this were inscribed two rules:  ‘(1) The Boss 
is always right; (2) If the Boss is wrong, then refer to Rule (1).”105  Similarly, Sir Keith 
Holyoake was never anxious to dispel a widely held belief that locked away in a private 
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 safe he held the signed, undated letters of resignation from all of his serving Cabinet 
Ministers.   
 
Former New Zealand Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Palmer has stated “Cabinet 
Government is based on teamwork – it is not and should never become presidential 
government.”106   Similarly, Weller notes that whilst prime ministers may be the 
individuals at the top of the political pile, essentially they are the leaders of teams.107  
This author submits that whilst the consensus approach is more in line with the 
Westminster system that New Zealand has developed, the degree to which prime 
ministerial power is exercised in a “presidential” manner is dependent upon the 
individual in office.  Indeed, the particular personality and style of a given prime minister 
will affect the extent to which they are simply “team leaders”.  Palmer has remarked that 
much of the Prime Minister’s power is dependent upon personality and temperament.108  
Political commentator, Rodney Brazier, has commented that “[t]he office of Prime 
Minister amounts to what each individual is able and willing to make of it.”109  Different 
leaders exercise influence in different ways: where foreign policy is concerned the same 
rule applies.   
 
The effect of MMP on the powers of the Prime Minister 
The advent of mixed member proportional (MMP) representation has impacted upon 
numerous New Zealand political institutions: the office of Prime Minister is no exception.  
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 Palmer and Palmer have observed that “[u]nder MMP the role is changing and evolving 
in new directions.”110  However, contrary to many predictions, to date, MMP has not 
resulted in Prime Ministers adopting more consensual leadership styles.  Current Prime 
Minister Helen Clark’s firm control over her government illustrates this point.  Indeed, 
the argument that the New Zealand political system is becoming “presidentialised” is 
gaining more credence.  Henderson has asserted that “New Zealand has continued along 
the path to a more presidential style of government.”111   
 
The constitutional powers of a Prime Minister have not been removed by the 
establishment of MMP.  Helen Clark’s decision to call an election, approximately three 
months early, in 2002 demonstrated that a Prime Minister under MMP still retains the 
right to call an early election.  Moreover, the dismissal of New Zealand First Deputy 
Prime Minister, Winston Peters, by former National Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley, 
confirmed that a Prime Minister’s power to dismiss Cabinet Ministers is unaffected under 
MMP.  
 
However, MMP has increased the likelihood of a change in government and, hence, 
Prime Minister between elections.  The potentially precarious nature of MMP 
Governments and Prime Ministers was illustrated by the collapse of the National-New 
Zealand First coalition Government, formed after the 1996 election.  Under MMP, Prime 
Ministers must not only manage their own caucus and Cabinet colleagues but also the 
Cabinet Ministers from other political parties with whom they are in coalition.  There will 
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 be a wider range of opinions on issues of the day, including those relating to foreign 
policy.  Therefore, a reduction in Prime Ministers’ domination of Cabinet may result.  
However, the example of Clark may indicate otherwise. 
 
Conclusion 
The Prime Minister is at the pinnacle of political power in New Zealand’s Westminster 
system of government.  The position is neither established nor defined by statute.112  A 
Prime Minister is able to dominate foreign policy through their chairpersonship of 
Cabinet and the Government caucus, their role as Government Spokesperson, the 
management of diplomatic appointments and the SIS portfolio.  The importance of the 
role of Prime Minister has not diminished under MMP; to date, neither have the powers.  
Prime Minister Helen Clark has demonstrated this point.    
 
In the following chapter the events that comprise the ANZUS dispute will be discussed.  
Of critical importance to the dispute is the Buchanan affair which will be examined in 
detail.  The extent of David Lange’s involvement in and significance to the ANZUS crisis 
will be revealed through close examination of the events that took place. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
NEW ZEALAND’S ANTI-NUCLEAR POLICY AND THE 
ANZUS DISPUTE 
 
The ANZUS Treaty, the tripartite arrangement that binds together Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States, was signed at San Francisco on 1 September 1951.  
Following World War II, Australia and New Zealand sought out an alliance with the 
United States in order to “bolt the back door” against a potential revival of Japanese 
militarism.  The ANZUS Treaty linked the United States, Australia and New Zealand in a 
military alliance.  Its terms set out the conditions and procedures under which the parties 
would act to meets threats to any one of them in the Pacific area.  For more than thirty 
years ANZUS was characterised by many as a model alliance.113   
 
The New Zealand Labour Party’s election victory on 4 July 1984 resulted in an official 
rejection of the nuclear deterrent doctrines and strategies of nuclear allies.  The party was 
elected to office in 1984 with the promise of keeping out nuclear ships but preserving the 
ANZUS alliance. The Labour Government’s position was that naval visits by ships of the 
United States, or any other ally, were welcome, provided the ships were not nuclear-
propelled or nuclear-armed.  Indeed, this action was the most fundamental challenge to 
the defence relationship with the United States since the establishment of the ANZUS 
alliance.114   
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 The Government, however, sought to maintain New Zealand’s independent membership 
of the ANZUS alliance, wanting to fulfil its military obligations in conventional terms 
only.  Prime Minister David Lange was adamant that New Zealand did not have to 
choose between ANZUS and its anti-nuclear policy.  He argued that unlike NATO, the 
ANZUS alliance had in the past been regarded by the treaty partners as a conventional 
alliance, not a nuclear alliance.115  Lange stated, “[t]here was no intention of leaving the 
alliance or becoming a sleeping partner in it…At that time it was my view that New 
Zealand could exclude nuclear weapons and remain in active alliance with a nuclear 
power.”116  The United States Administration was of a different opinion.   
 
The Buchanan Affair 
Following the ANZUS Council meeting in Wellington in July 1984, United States 
Secretary of State, George Shultz, met with Lange, then Prime Minister-elect, making it 
clear that United States naval vessels visiting New Zealand ports were regarded as one of 
the important ways in which New Zealand made its contribution to the alliance.  Shultz 
stated: “If the incoming government’s policies proved to be incompatible with the articles 
of the ANZUS Treaty Alliance, the United States is not prepared to renegotiate the 
treaty.”117  
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 This meeting between Lange and Shultz remains one of the most contentious aspects of 
the ANZUS dispute.  There are two schools of thought on what undertakings Lange gave 
to Shultz when talking about his government’s anti-nuclear policy and its implications for 
U.S. naval visits.  Shultz left the meeting believing that Lange had indicated that he 
required 6 months in which to get on top of party opposition to nuclear ship visits.  A 
request for a naval ship visit after this time would be met with a positive response.118  
However, Lange is adamant that he gave no such undertaking to Shultz: “I gave him no 
reason to think that I would concede him the nuclear-free policy for the sake of keeping 
ANZUS alive.”119  In support of Lange’s claims, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Mervyn Norrish, stated at a parliamentary conference in 2004:  
The Secretary of State convinced himself that Mr Lange had intimated that over the following six 
months he would bring about some change in his party’s policy on nuclear ship visits.  I was the 
only other person there and I did not interpret Lange’s comments that way.  He did indeed say that 
he would be talking to party members about the issue at Labour branch conferences over the next 
six months ahead.  Perhaps there was a touch of ambiguity there.  But he did not say either then or 
at a later meeting in New York, that he would bring about a changed outcome. 120  
 
      
This misunderstanding proved to be a significant factor in the dispute.  It subsequently 
coloured Shultz’s attitude to Lange, who would later be regarded as having gone back on 
his word.  
 
Following the Labour Party’s election, senior members of the bureaucracy endeavoured 
to find a means of reconciling New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy with the United States’ 
unshakeable policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons 
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 on their vessels.  Lange’s advisors felt that if New Zealand had a ship visit from a vessel 
which was, to all reasonable senses, not nuclear-armed or nuclear-propelled that this 
would buy the government time in which the United States would not press New Zealand 
for any further naval visits; thus enabling the issue to be worked through more calmly 
over a greater time period. 121    Accordingly, Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Sir 
Ewan Jamieson; Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervyn Norrish; and Head of the Prime 
Minister’s Department, Gerald Hensley, suggested to Lange that Jamieson meet with 
United States Navy officials in Hawaii.122  Jamieson would seek to find a suitable ship 
that would be acceptable to the U.S and not contravene New Zealand’s anti-nuclear 
policy.  Lange acquiesced.  Jamieson believed he had found an appropriate vessel in the 
Buchanan.  Indeed, Norrish has stated that the Buchanan certainly would not have had 
nuclear weapons on board.123   
 
Lange later wrote that he confided only in his deputy, Geoffrey Palmer and third-ranked 
minister, Mike Moore, about these secret diplomatic negotiations.124  Lange was also 
quoted at a post-Cabinet press conference in December 1984 as saying the United States 
will not seek permission for a nuclear warship to visit New Zealand.  He said further that, 
“the American people and Government are, in my view, intelligent and aware and they 
are not going to engage in some sort of needless, pointless, provocative incident.”125  
These comments may suggest that Lange did believe a solution was in the making. 
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 In mid-January 1985, the United States issued a formal request for a visit by the USS 
Buchanan.  At this time, Lange was visiting the Tokelaus.  Lange’s visit to the Tokelaus 
has been widely criticised.  He was seen by some to have simply “walked off the job”.  
Former Secretary of Defence, Denis McLean, has stated that Lange went on holiday in 
order to avoid facing down the radicals on the issue.126  He was made aware of the 
American request by his officials back in New Zealand.  Upon his return, Lange was met 
with two recommendations.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was of the opinion that the 
proposed ship visit should proceed.  The Buchanan, “an aged, small, conventionally 
powered ship not normally deployed to areas of high tension” 127 had an extremely low 
probability of being nuclear-armed.  The alternative recommendation was authored by 
Geoffrey Palmer, who had been Acting-Prime Minister in Lange’s absence.  He 
recommended that the request be declined as New Zealand officials were unable to 
categorically state that the Buchanan was not going to be either nuclear-powered or 
nuclear-armed.   
 
It should be noted that Palmer’s recommendation was strongly supported by the Labour 
Party Executive who were adamant that New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy was non-
negotiable.  Labour Party President, Margaret Wilson, had earlier met with Palmer to 
discuss the American request.  She and the Labour Party Executive were resolved that as 
the Buchanan was capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the request should be 
declined.128  This change in policy from nuclear-armed to nuclear-capable ensured that 
the issue came to an end.  Hensley has noted: “Certainly from a civil service point or 
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 view there was not much more that could be done once that political decision had been 
taken that nuclear-capability rather than actual assessment of nuclear-probabilities was 
the issue.”129 
 
Lange accepted Palmer’s recommendation and, with caucus and Cabinet approval, 
declined the American request.  Kevin Clements, a peace activist, has claimed that at the 
particular meetings which discussed the request for the Buchanan to visit, Lange “found 
himself outmanoeuvred in Cabinet and caucus.”130  This is not a view shared by David 
Caygill, a senior Cabinet Minister at the time: He has stated that Lange was not at the 
critical Cabinet meeting as he was still making his way back to New Zealand from the 
Tokelaus.131   
 
In an effort to salvage the situation, Lange suggested to United States Ambassador, H. 
Munroe Browne, that the United States might like to request a visit of a ship from the 
Oliver Hazard Perry Class, a type universally understood to be solely conventionally 
armed.132  This proposal was subsequently leaked to the media, putting an end to a 
possible compromise.133  Despite Lange following up the conversation with a formal 
invitation to the United States to send a vessel of a non-nuclear-capable class, Browne 
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 replied on behalf of the U.S. Administration that “it was the Buchanan or nothing.”134   
Lange has noted: 
The American ambassador wrote to me with the stark advice that it was the Buchanan or nothing.  
This letter I took to cabinet.  The cabinet had not changed its mind: the Buchanan was not coming.  
I wrote back to the ambassador telling him that New Zealand was unable from its own resources to 
determine if the Buchanan conformed with our policy, and for that reason we must decline its 
visit.135 
 
The Logic of Lange’s Decision 
The rationale behind Lange’s decision to accept Palmer’s recommendation and to decline 
the American request for the Buchanan to visit has been the subject of much speculation.  
In his memoirs when writing of this decision, Lange simply states: “I supported Palmer’s 
assessment and the cabinet agreed.”136  Cabinet agreement on the decision to reject the 
Buchanan is a point which former Labour Cabinet Minister, Dr. Michael Bassett, takes 
issue with.  In his Fulbright lecture, delivered in December 2002, Bassett asserts that the 
Buchanan was rejected following a unilateral decision by Lange and not collective 
Cabinet agreement.137  Bassett argues further that in early 1985 Lange was leading the 
Labour Party in name only.  He capitulated to the “Left” of the Labour Party in rejecting 
the naval visit in an effort to win over his party.138  The Cabinet and caucus were not 
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 fully informed, and simply “went along with him because they, too, hoped to heal the
inside the Labour Party.”
 rift 
                                                
139 
 
Jamieson, shares a similar opinion.  He has commented that Lange “was targeted by and 
became increasingly under the influence of those within the parliamentary arm of the 
Labour Party of much greater ideological resolve and stronger anti-American passion 
than his own.”140  Jamieson also asserts that in leaving for the Tokelaus, Lange was 
deliberately withdrawing from the scene.  Upon his return he simply went through a 
“short charade of negotiations with the U.S. before making the pre-ordained decision and, 
so, delivering the coup de grace to our participation in ANZUS.”141 
 
Support for this school of thought is found in the memoirs of former Australian Prime 
Minister, Bob Hawke, which recall a conversation between Hawke and Lange about New 
Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy:  
[Lange] indicated that the nuclear-free policy had been fashioned by the Left and accepted by the 
party, and there was virtually nothing he could do about it.  I told Lange I was angered by this and 
couldn’t understand how he could possibly conduct foreign policy in the best interests of New 
Zealand on the basis of such a compact.  He shrugged resignedly and said that unfortunately that 
was the way it was.142  
 
In response to these claims Lange stated:  
As I have often said, have written, been quoted on, understood and accepted, the anti-nuclear 
movement in New Zealand was not a loony-tunes movement of the Left or the unions or even the 
Labour Party.  It became a mainstream political issue after (former Prime Minister Norman) Kirk 
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 did the New Zealand Government demonstration at Mururoa back in the seventies.  It became an 
Anglican Mothers’ Union issue.143 
 
However, former Secretary of Defence, Denis McLean, also shares Hawke’s view of the 
reasoning behind Lange’s decision to reject the Buchanan.  He asserts that Lange “simply 
accepted a fait accompli”.144  He chose not to challenge the Left of the party on the anti-
nuclear issue.  Furthermore, McLean points to the fact that Lange did not take the prudent 
course of gathering a coalition around him of those members of the Labour caucus and 
Cabinet who did not want to fall into a dispute with the United States.145  However, this 
point may illustrate that Lange himself was committed to the anti-nuclear policy 
regardless of the consequences of its implementation.       
 
Bassett’s fellow Cabinet Minister, David Caygill, offers a different opinion as to 
Cabinet’s participation in the decision regarding the Buchanan.  In an interview 
undertaken by this author, Caygill noted that Lange was not involved directly in the 
decision to reject the Buchanan at all:  “Geoffrey [Acting-Prime Minister, Geoffrey 
Palmer] talked about it at Cabinet and Cabinet debated it and rejected the visit…The 
fundamental decision to reject the visit was made at Cabinet.”146 Furthermore, he 
suggested that Lange was not captured by the “Left” of the Labour Party and points to the 
fact that Lange was involved in the plans which subsequently led to the proposal from the 
Americans to send the Buchanan.  
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 Furthermore, in an interview conducted by Vernon Wright in 1987, the then Deputy  
Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, stated he believed Lange “arrived at the same 
conclusion [regarding the Buchanan] I arrived at on the evidence I sent him, and then 
when we had a cabinet discussion about it there didn’t seem to be any dissent at all.”147  
Indeed, Palmer and Caygill’s accounts of events appear to differ somewhat to Bassett’s 
recollection of how things unfolded during that period. 
 
Public Opinion on the Anti-Nuclear Policy and ANZUS 
Public opinion was an arguably significant element of the ANZUS debate.  Lange has 
noted that the Labour Government’s intention to prohibit nuclear weapons from entering 
New Zealand was “the reflection of a substantial movement of public opinion in New 
Zealand.”148  Public opposition to French nuclear testing in the Pacific provided the 
impetus for the anti-nuclear policy that would come to define New Zealand’s foreign 
policy in the 1980s.  The results of the New Zealand general election of July 1984 
provide a crude indication of public attitudes about the nuclear ships issue.  The 
percentage of votes cast for Labour was 42.5 per cent, the New Zealand Party gained 12.9 
per cent, and the Social Credit Party attracted 8 per cent.149  The National Party obtained 
36 per cent of the New Zealand vote.150  Therefore, the total votes cast for parties with a 
declared policy to exclude nuclear ships amounted to 63.4 per cent.  However, as Stuart 
McMillan points out, those who voted against the Government may have been swayed 
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 more by voting out the National Party and its dominating Prime Minister, Robert 
Muldoon, than they were by the prospect of a nuclear ships ban.151 
 
A useful indicator of the strength of public opinion in New Zealand prior to the election 
of the Labour Party lies in the results of the national campaign of the New Zealand 
Nuclear Free Zone Committee.   On 14 July 1983, 872,000 people (28 per cent of the 
New Zealand population) lived in officially declared nuclear free regions.152  By 
November 1984, the number of people living in a nuclear free zone had risen to 
2,075,747, amounting to 65 per cent of the population.153  This campaign serves to 
highlight the potency of the anti-nuclear sentiment shared by the New Zealand public.   
 
In 1986 the New Zealand Government sponsored an extensive debate on security policy.  
The Prime Minister established a Defence Committee of Enquiry led by Frank Corner 
which, in turn, commissioned a comprehensive public opinion poll and public hearings in 
1986.  The poll found that 92 per cent of New Zealanders opposed the stationing of 
nuclear weapons in New Zealand.154  Overall 66 per cent of respondents wanted nuclear 
armed ships banned from visiting New Zealand ports.155  Of significance is the finding 
that 52 per cent of New Zealanders were found to prefer staying in the ANZUS alliance 
should a nuclear free policy prove to be incompatible with membership of ANZUS; only 
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 44 per cent of New Zealanders wanted to ban nuclear ship visits even if that entailed 
removing New Zealand from ANZUS.156 
 
This public opinion poll indicates that support for ANZUS remained relatively high in 
New Zealand in the 1980s.  However, it is also evident that the anti-nuclear movement in 
New Zealand was mainstream.  Unlike in many other countries, anti-nuclear sentiment 
was not reflected simply by a minority of the population: as noted above, over 90 per cent 
of the population opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons in New Zealand, and over 60 
per cent wanted to ban all nuclear armed ships from New Zealand ports.   
 
The rationale behind the New Zealand public’s opposition to nuclear ship visits is 
examined by Keith Jackson and Jim Lamare.  They note the results of a 1983 poll which 
found that opponents of nuclear ship visits based their position upon a fear of nuclear 
accidents while United States’ ships were berthed in New Zealand harbours; a general 
worry about the prospect of nuclear war; a rejection of the overall viability of a nuclear 
defence strategy; or a concern that the mere presence of nuclear weapons in the country 
would make New Zealand a target of nuclear attack.157  Similarly, Paul Landais-Stamp 
and Paul Rogers note that since the 1960s, the New Zealand peace movement has 
maintained that New Zealand’s involvement in ANZUS and its willingness to provide 
port facilities to United States’ warships serve to make New Zealand a potential target in 
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 a nuclear war.158  Also of concern to New Zealanders was the mounting threat posed to 
world security by the continuing arms build up of the preceding decades.159  Accordingly, 
the New Zealand public appears to have opposed the nuclear ship visits for security 
reasons.  In contrast, opposition to French nuclear testing was based on environmental 
and health concerns.    
 
The Repercussions of Refusal 
The United States did not take kindly to New Zealand’s decision to reject the Buchanan.  
Ambassador Browne asserted that ANZUS was responsible for keeping the South Pacific 
region free of hostility and unwelcome influence.160  Furthermore, he argued that “[i]n 
effect [the New Zealand] government has said that the very ships which would defend 
New Zealand in time of war may not enter New Zealand ports in time of peace.”161       
 
United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, remarked:   
When New Zealand decided to reject the Buchanan it also decided, in effect, that the basic 
operational elements of the ANZUS treaty would not apply to it.  In a sense New Zealand walked 
off the job – the job of working with each other to defend our common security.162 
 
The swift and extensive response of the United States Administration demonstrated to 
Lange that indeed an anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS alliance (as far as the United 
States was concerned) were fundamentally incompatible.  All scheduled military 
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 exercises, including the upcoming Exercise Sea Eagle were cancelled.  Intelligence 
cooperation with New Zealand was immediately discontinued.  High-level United States 
officials would not meet their New Zealand counterparts.  Indeed, “political contact was 
severely curtailed.”163   
 
Of particular concern to New Zealand was the threatened trade backlash.  In September 
1984, Shultz had stated that ANZUS was not an economic agreement in any sense.164  
Despite this, prior to the decision to bar the Buchanan, New Zealand Minister of Trade, 
Mike Moore, warned that possible American reprisals would extend beyond the military 
area.165  Indeed, in 1985, United States Congressman Dick Cheney introduced a Bill that 
would bar imports from New Zealand and Australia.166According to Cheney, he 
introduced the Bill because he was “[angered] by their uncooperative attitude towards US 
international defence policy…If these countries are not willing to share the burden and 
responsibility of defending freedom, why should we facilitate their enjoyment of 
freedom’s benefits such as unrestrained access to our markets…”167   
 
In response to these threats, Lange argued that it should be remembered that “the last 
time the United States mounted sanctions was in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion 
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 of Afghanistan.  That may put the matter of trade sanctions in perspective.”168  
Fortunately for New Zealand trade sanctions were never imposed.  In fact, in the year 
ending June 1985 the value of exports to America increased by 49.1 per cent to nearly 
$NZ1.6 billion.169 
 
The severity of the United States’ response to New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance has 
been attributed to the concern of the Reagan Administration about the possible ripple 
effect of New Zealand’s example on other allied countries.170  The “kiwi disease”, as it 
became known, was what some American officials believed could weaken the Western 
nuclear deterrence strategy, which had ensured peace in the world for approximately forty 
years.171  “Through its response, the United States Government hoped to signal to other 
countries the seriousness with which it is prepared to view any efforts to diminish 
defence cooperation among allies.”172  
 
Also of concern to New Zealand’s policy makers was the strain upon Trans-Tasman 
relations following the Buchanan fiasco.  There was considerable divergence between the 
views of the Australian and New Zealand Labour parties on nuclear issues.  The official 
Australian position on ship visits was stated thus:   
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 The dispute between New Zealand and the United States over visits by ships and aircraft has 
seriously damaged the defense relationship between our two allies.  Australia is not a party to the 
dispute.  It accepts, however, that access within reasonable environmental constraints for ships and 
aircraft is a normal part of an alliance relationship.  Australia regrets that New Zealand policy 
detracts from that relationship.173 
 
This difference of opinion is further illustrated in a letter written by Australian Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke to David Lange on 2 February 1985, which was subsequently 
leaked to the media.  In it Hawke states: “We cannot accept as a permanent arrangement 
that the ANZUS Alliance has a different meaning and entails different obligations for 
different members.”174   
 
It is evident that the Australian Government and the New Zealand Government did not 
agree upon all things nuclear, and New Zealand increasingly gained the reputation of a 
“free rider” in matters of defence.175 
 
Lange’s Presentation of New Zealand’s Anti-Nuclear Policy on the World Stage 
Despite incurring the wrath of its traditional allies, Lange continued to present New 
Zealand’s nuclear-free policy on the international stage.  Arguably the most important 
international event at which New Zealand’s rationale for its anti-nuclear policy was 
articulated was the Oxford Union Debate, held in March 1985.  Lange took part in the 
internationally televised debate with Reverend Jerry Falwell as his opposition.  The topic 
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 of debate was: Nuclear weapons are morally indefensible.  Lange attended against the 
wishes of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Government.  
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervyn Norrish, has commented that “with the Oxford 
Union Debate, he was taking a considerable risk, so far as relationships with the British 
and Americans were concerned.”  This risk did not appear to faze Lange.  He has 
commented that “Margaret Thatcher sent a note through her High Commissioner, which 
he delivered to me, asking me not to do it.  And that sealed it…I decided definitely to 
go.”176 
 
Lange’s performance has been widely acknowledged to be “the stuff of legend”.  His 
superior oratorical skills and quick wit were on show for a worldwide audience to 
appreciate.  Lange has noted: “I was pleased that the debate would let me make the case 
for what I always saw as the essential part of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy, which 
was our refusal to allow ourselves to be defended by nuclear weapons.”177   He goes on to 
note that the Oxford Union debate was the highest point of his career in politics.178   
 
Indeed, commentators alike share this view.  Political scientist, Jon Johansson, has 
asserted that “Lange’s actual performance at the Oxford Union was arguably his 
crowning achievement as Prime Minister.”179  Moreover, “it was a rare display of public 
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 leadership and one that saw Lange translate his and his government’s moral convictions 
into forceful and penetrating rhetoric.”180   
 
The international media were just as enamoured with Lange’s appearance at Oxford.  
Following the debate, The Economist described Lange as “a new star of the anti-nuclear 
movement.”181  The Washington Post commented: “Lange, looking tanned and confident, 
gave every impression of enjoying the battle immensely.”182  In addition, The Miami 
Herald described Lange as a “jolly, lowly speaker who appeared to delight in the crowded 
chambers and the bright television lights.”183  The Observer said that Lange exceeded his 
debating opponent in physical girth and “greater intellectual stature”.184 
 
The United States Administration was not as taken with Lange’s performance. Lange’s 
most famous one-liner “I can smell the uranium on [your breath]”delivered to an 
American interjector was regarded by the United States as the final insult.  Indeed, Time 
magazine commented that “predictably the Prime Minister’s comments did not go down 
well in Washington.”185  Lange himself has noted: 
The one thing the Americans never forgave me for was that interjection.  That was deemed by 
them to have been a terrible slight in the relationship and it says something for my inability to 
understand what American sensitivities are about.186 
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 The slight the United States felt Lange had dealt arguably contributed to their response, 
or lack thereof, to the 1985 bombing of the Greenpeace protest ship the Rainbow 
Warrior.187  This act of terrorism perpetrated by a French Government agency was met 
with no official response from any New Zealand ally.  Lange noted: “the leaders of the 
West expressed not a moments outrage about terrorism directed by a government against 
opponents of nuclear deterrence.”188  Landais-Stamp and Rogers note that “the bombing 
reinforced and hardened anti-nuclear attitudes and instilled a nationalistic pride and 
determination to maintain the nuclear-free policies.”189  New Zealand had experienced 
first hand the reality of lying outside the nuclear fold.   
 
The bombing of the Rainbow Warrior will not be analysed further in the course of this 
thesis as it does not constitute part of the ANZUS dispute per se.    
 
Diplomatic Efforts to Breach the Impasse 
During 1985 and 1986 various meetings took place between officials; all with the 
objective of reaching a mutually acceptable outcome for New Zealand and the United 
States.  In 1985 Palmer visited officials in Washington; the main purpose of his visit 
being to take the draft legislation to American officials and negotiate it in detail in a 
manner that they may find capable of accommodation.190  Among others, Palmer met 
with Secretary of State, George Shultz and Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger.  No 
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 understanding was able to be reached during the course of Palmer’s visit.  Furthermore, 
United States officials were reported to have been quite unhappy with how negotiations 
with Palmer unfolded.  A Ministry of Foreign Affairs telex dated 16 October 1985 noted 
an article in the Dominion newspaper which stated that the American officials had said 
the negotiations with Palmer “had little point” and that there had been “no good faith or 
movement on the fundamentals”.191  
 
Caygill, also undertook a private and confidential meeting with senior State Department 
officials in 1985.192  The meeting focused on the impact of the proposed nuclear-free 
legislation and how that might be reconciled with a resumption of port access by United 
States vessels and the preservation of “neither confirm nor deny”. 
 
Caygill also discussed New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS rupture at a 
meeting with eleven members of the United States House of Representatives Armed 
Service Committee at Christchurch in January 1986.193  The meeting proved to be 
somewhat hostile in tone.  The delegation was concerned that New Zealand was after a 
“free ride” from the United States and why exactly it was necessary to legislate the anti-
nuclear policy.194  Similarly to Palmer, Caygill’s negotiations did not provide a solution 
to the dispute. 
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 The Enactment of Anti-Nuclear Legislation and the Creation of the South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone 
By 1986 Lange and his Government were resigned to accept that ANZUS was indeed a 
nuclear alliance and as such New Zealand could no longer remain an active member.  In 
1987 Lange remarked: “The ANZUS alliance has been unequivocally revealed in the last 
three years to be a nuclear alliance, a defence arrangement underpinned by a global 
strategy of nuclear deterrence.  As long as it retains that character it is no use to New 
Zealand.”195  Neither New Zealand nor the United States formally withdrew from the 
alliance.  However, at the ANZUS Council meeting in August 1986 at San Francisco, 
United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, issued a statement in which he expressed 
regret that New Zealand’s actions had disrupted the alliance relationship, and that the 
United States could no longer be expected to carry out its security obligations towards 
New Zealand.196  New Zealand was now deemed to be a “friend”, no longer an ally.  It 
was apparent that a watershed had been reached, a point where both nations recognised 
that their different perceptions and policies made it impossible for an effective alliance 
relationship to continue. 
 
Following these negative reactions, New Zealand was not deterred from its anti-nuclear 
resolve.  Lange repeatedly stated that New Zealand does not ask, nor does it expect to be 
defended by nuclear weapons.197  Accordingly, the Government went ahead with its plans 
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 to entrench its anti-nuclear policies in law.198  On 10th December 1985, the New Zealand 
Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill was introduced into the House 
of Representatives.  When introducing the Bill, Lange stated that “in practical terms, the 
Bill means that New Zealand has completely disengaged itself from any nuclear strategy 
for the defence of New Zealand.”199   
 
To the chagrin of United States officials, the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, 
Disarmament and Arms Control Act was officially passed into law on 4 July 1987.200  
The Act formally established New Zealand territory and coastal waters as a Nuclear-Free 
Zone.  Furthermore, the Act prohibits visits to New Zealand by all nuclear powered ships, 
and by all foreign warships unless “the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will 
not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal waters of 
New Zealand.”201  Some commentators have argued that this clause in the legislation 
directly challenges the United States’ “neither confirm nor deny” policy, for it provides 
for the New Zealand Government independently deciding whether or not ships or aircraft 
from nuclear states are likely to be carrying nuclear weapons.   
 
The United States regarded this unprecedented move to impose a legislative ban on 
nuclear ship visits as quite unacceptable.  It was evident that the United States made a 
distinction between policy and legislation.  There was the impression among some United 
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 States officials that the passing of legislation would tie the hands of future New Zealand 
Governments.202  However, when the legislation finally passed, there was little overt 
reaction from the United States Administration.203  Similarly, the passage of the 
Broomfield Act in August 1987 by the US Congress, which confirmed New Zealand’s 
status had been officially down-graded from that of an ally to that of a friend, was 
accepted with remarkable composure in New Zealand.204 
 
The legislation also enacted into law those provisions of the South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone Treaty which required legislative sanction.  The Treaty, promoted in the South 
Pacific Forum since 1975, had come into effect on 11 December 1986.205  The signatory 
countries agreed to place strict limits on the presence of nuclear weapons in their 
territory.  Under the terms of the Treaty, the testing and stationing of nuclear weapons in 
their territory is prohibited.  Furthermore, each party to the Treaty has agreed to not 
possess, build or take control of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.206  In order to 
circumvent Australia’s commitments to the United States under the ANZUS Treaty, each 
signatory is allowed to accept visits by nuclear-armed ships and aircraft.207  The Treaty 
was not greeted with enthusiasm by the United States Administration.  This was 
illustrated by its refusal to sign the protocols to the Treaty under which nuclear weapon 
states were invited to undertake commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
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 explosive devices against member states in the Zone, and not to test nuclear weapons in 
the Zone.   
 
It should be noted that as the creation of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone was not a 
fundamental element of the ANZUS dispute, it will not be examined further in the course 
of this thesis.      
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The execution of the New Zealand Government’s anti-nuclear policy in 1985 brought to 
an end the more than thirty year old military alliance it had enjoyed with the United 
States.  In rejecting the American request for the Buchanan to visit, New Zealand was 
deemed by the United States to have ended its role in the ANZUS alliance.  Despite 
efforts to breach the subsequent impasse, the alliance relationship between the two 
nations could not be salvaged.  Much to the consternation of Washington, the New 
Zealand Government succeeded in enacting the anti-nuclear policy into law.   
As Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lange played a crucial role during 
this period.  Despite being committed to the anti-nuclear policy of his Government, much 
controversy surrounds the course of action he took.  His management of the dispute with 
the United States has been much criticised, by both his political colleagues and public 
service advisors.  However, Lange’s rhetorical leadership of the anti-nuclear issue has 
received widespread praise.  Through his superior oratorical skills, Lange superbly 
presented New Zealand’s argument for rejecting the nuclear-arms race on the 
international stage.  
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 The following chapter will address the first section of Hermann’s theoretical framework 
and apply it directly to the case study of David Lange and the ANZUS dispute.  The 
nature of the situation with which Lange was faced when addressing this foreign policy 
issue will be examined.  As articulated in Hermann’s work, the decision latitude afforded 
to Lange, his ability to define the situation at hand and his participation in the decision-
making process related to the ANZUS crisis will be analysed.   
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 CHAPTER 6 
NATURE OF THE SITUATION: DECISION LATITUDE, 
DEFINITION OF SITUATION, AND PARTICIPATION 
 
Theorists widely acknowledge the significance of situational factors when analysing the 
effect of a leader’s personality on the foreign policy-making process.  The various 
courses of action available to a leader will depend upon the circumstances in which they 
are required to operate.  Indeed, a restrictive situation will ensure a leader has limited, 
accessible options when addressing a foreign policy issue.   
 
Hermann’s model addresses the nature of the situation with which a political leader is 
faced.208  Decision latitude, definition of the situation and participation by a leader 
comprise this section of her model.  
 
Decision Latitude 
First, wide decision latitude provides more scope for influence by a leader’s personal 
characteristics. As noted in Chapter 2, Hermann gives the example of the “honeymoon” 
period following a landslide election.209  Newly appointed leaders are afforded a certain 
‘capital’, based on possibly popularity or fear, which places them in a better position to 
achieve policy changes.   
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 An analysis of the political context which gave rise to Lange assuming power and the 
environment he was working in at the time of the ANZUS dispute will assist in 
determining the extent of decision latitude Lange was afforded.  Lange came to power 
following the snap-election held on 14th July 1984.  The snap-election had been called by 
the then National Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, who had claimed himself unable to 
command a majority in the House following National MP, Marilyn Waring, crossing the 
floor to support a Labour bill which purported to make New Zealand nuclear free.  The 
bill was subsequently defeated by renegade Labour Parliamentarians voting against it.   
 
The Labour Party’s victory heralded an end to Muldoon’s reign over New Zealand’s 
political landscape.  He had held the office of Prime Minister for nine years.  As Prime 
Minister, Muldoon also held the finance portfolio providing for an extreme concentration 
of power.  Muldoon wielded power in an autocratic manner.  He instilled fear and 
intimidation in opponents and supporters alike.  Indeed, Lange wrote in 1990: “when I 
entered [Parliament], it was dominated by the scourge of unpopular minorities and inviter 
of nuclear vessels to New Zealand, Robert Muldoon.”210  Lange’s victory brought this 
oppression to an end.  He “embodied a liberation of both our politics and our 
language.”211  Bruce Jesson has asserted that “Labour came to power in 1984 amid a 
mood of euphoria and goodwill, earned by its election theme of bringing the country 
together again.”212  Indeed, Lange appeared to many to be the right man at this point in 
time to lead New Zealand. 
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 Furthermore, Lange’s appointment as Prime Minister announced a generational shift in 
New Zealand’s political leadership.  Upon assuming the office of Prime Minister, Lange 
was forty-one years old.  Lange and the majority of his Labour colleagues were of the 
“Vietnam” generation.  Those individuals whom they were replacing in government were 
of the “World-War II” generation.  In a 1986 speech, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Mervyn Norrish, contended that one of the most important factors leading to New 
Zealand’s new-found independence and confidence in its dealings with the outside world 
was “the transition of power to the post-war generation.  You see it in the make-up of the 
present Cabinet, with an average age in the forties.”213 
 
Inevitably accompanying this shift were new political ideas and agendas, one of which 
was the Labour Party’s firm anti-nuclear policy.  This policy was a significant component 
of the Labour Party’s election campaigning: it was a manifesto promise.214  Moreover, 
anti-nuclear sentiment had increasingly gained public support and, it can be argued, had 
become a mainstream issue at the time Lange came to power.  This widespread public 
support for an anti-nuclear policy would have affected the range of options available to 
Lange and his Government when seeking to resolve the dispute with the United States 
regarding the Buchanan.   
 
Ross Vintiner, Lange’s Press Secretary, was involved heavily in the Buchanan affair and 
is of the opinion that Lange had no other option but to accept Palmer’s recommendation 
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 and decline the American request.215  He has argued that “to [allow the Buchanan to 
visit] would have been political suicide.  You would have put doubt in the public m
introduced doubt about the policy, and introduced an enormous amount of lobbying 
around the issue.”
ind, 
                                                
216  John Henderson, the Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, has 
noted that had Lange allowed the Buchanan to visit the ensuing public outcry may have 
prevented the Fourth Labour Government winning a second term.217 
 
The dispute with the United States regarding port visits quickly followed the Labour 
Party’s election.  As was outlined in the preceding chapter, political and diplomatic 
negotiations took place immediately following the election result.  The request for the 
Buchanan visit was made and declined less than a year after Labour came to power.  
 
Constraints upon the decision latitude afforded to Lange did however exist: the emphatic 
opinion of the Labour Party Executive providing the strongest restriction.  For the Party 
Executive the anti-nuclear policy was “non-negotiable”.218  Labour Party President, 
Margaret Wilson, met with Lange and in his absence, Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey 
Palmer, to discuss the anti-nuclear policy.  She was resolved that the Executive would in 
no way support acceptance of the American request for the Buchanan to visit.  As the 
vessel was capable of carrying nuclear arms the request could in no way be 
accommodated.  The opinion of Labour Party Executive carried substantial weight within 
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 the party as a whole and as such Lange was not at liberty to simply ignore it.  Support of 
the Executive was crucial to the stability of the Government as a whole.  Thus, to some 
extent, it limited the decision latitude afforded to Lange when attempting to work through 
the crisis.  However, it is unclear just how much this came to bear upon Lange’s final 
decision to reject the Buchanan. 
 
Lange was required to navigate the ANZUS dispute during what would be termed his 
“honeymoon” period in office.  He had come to power following a snap-election, 
deposing the oppressive incumbent.  His party’s victory heralded a generational shift 
bringing with it a publicly supported anti-nuclear policy.  Therefore, it can be argued that 
Lange indeed had the political ‘capital’ afforded to newly appointed, popular leaders 
when he tackled the issue of port access and ANZUS.  Despite the limitations imposed by 
the Labour Party Executive and public opinion, it is evident that Lange had wide decision 
latitude within which to work. 
 
Definition of the Situation 
Secondly, situations that require a political leader to define or interpret them allow for 
their personal characteristics to have more impact.  An ambiguous situation is one such 
example.  It can be argued that attempting to reconcile New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy 
with the United States’ policy of NCND was such a situation that required definition.   
 
First, prior to the Fourth Labour Government coming to power, the alliance between New 
Zealand and the United States had never been questioned.  The dispute with the United 
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 States was indeed unprecedented.  Previous New Zealand governments had taken issue 
with nuclear warships prior to this but disputes had never eventuated.  The Third Labour 
Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Norman Kirk, was strongly opposed 
to the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific by France.  That Government had also 
inherited the ‘ban’ established under the preceding National Government which 
suspended visits of nuclear warships in light of questions of insurance liabilities.219  
Hence, after the USS Enterprise visited Wellington in 1964 no nuclear powered vessels 
visited New Zealand until 1976.  The anti-nuclear policy of the Lange Government 
proved to be the only policy that would jeopardise New Zealand’s membership in the 
ANZUS alliance.  Given that the Government had no forerunner with which to compare 
its strategy, ambiguity arguably surrounded the situation.  The Government was faced 
with a foreign affairs crisis and required Lange to forge ahead with defining the issues at 
hand. 
 
Lange often spoke at length publicly about New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and the 
dispute with the United States in an effort to clarify the situation.  He went to great pains 
to explain the purpose of the anti-nuclear policy, the rationale behind it, and its 
implications from the New Zealand perspective.  Lange also attempted to demonstrate 
how New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy would not necessarily spell the end of New 
Zealand’s participation in the ANZUS alliance.   
 
                                                 
219 The New Zealand Government, led by Keith Holyoake, chose to suspend visits as insurance companies 
were reluctant to accept the risk of an accident involving U.S nuclear warships whilst stationed in New 
Zealand ports.  This ban was lifted in 1976 by the Muldoon-led Government following the passing of 
legislation in the U.S. which accepted absolute liability for accident involving U.S. warships abroad.  
   69
 In an effort to elucidate the logic underpinning the anti-nuclear policy, Lange stated 
during the Oxford Union debate in 1985:   
It makes no sense for a country which faces no threat to seek to surround itself with nuclear weapons. It 
makes no sense for that country to ask its allies to deter enemies which do not yet exist with the threat 
of nuclear weapons.  It makes no sense for a region which is the most stable in the world to allow itself 
to become a strategic arena for the nuclear powers.  Having considered all this, the people of New 
Zealand reached a straightforward conclusion; the nuclear weapons which defended them caused them 
more alarm than any which threatened them, and it was accordingly pointless to be defended by 
them.220 
In attempting to further define the implications for the policy, Lange repeatedly stated 
nations should follow.221  The New Zealand policy was not for “export”.  Furthermore, 
Lange strongly argued that ANZUS was indeed not a nuclear alliance and therefore New 
February 1985, Lange stated: “New Zealand is, and intends to remain, a committed 
United States to find a practical solution which meets the interests of both countries.”222  
In a speech delivered in Los Angeles in February 1985 Lange asserted that “[u]nlike 
conventional alliance, not a nuclear alliance.  The treaty does not oblige New Zealand to 
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Zealand’s participation in it should not come into question.  In a press statement on 1 
member of ANZUS ...I continue to believe that it is possible for New Zealand and the 
NATO, the ANZUS alliance has in the past been regarded by the treaty partners as a 
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 accept nuclear weapons.”223  Lange was adamant that “[t]he ANZUS alliance remains at 
the heart of New Zealand’s security preoccupations.”224   
However, Lange was forced to redefine the situation once it became apparent that 
agreement with the United States on this particular issue was not possible.  In 1987 he 
noted:  
[t]he ANZUS alliance has been unequivocally revealed in the last three years to be a nuclear alliance, a 
defence arrangement underpinned by a global strategy of nuclear deterrence.  As long as it retains that 
character it is no use to New Zealand and New Zealand had better make arrangements which are better 
suited to our own circumstances.225 
 
 
Participation 
Lastly, personal characteristics will have more impact on foreign policy in situations in 
which a political leader is likely to participate in the decision-making process.  One such 
example of this is a time of crisis.   
 
Following the implementation of the Government’s anti-nuclear policy, a dispute ensued 
between New Zealand and its most powerful ally: the military alliance which New 
Zealand had been a member of for more than thirty years was on the verge of collapse.  
This foreign policy crisis warranted significant involvement by the individual who held 
both the office of Prime Minister and the foreign affairs portfolio. Accordingly, Lange 
was the political actor who participated most heavily in the critical dealings. 
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 First, as Prime Minister and Minster of Foreign Affairs, Lange was responsible for 
articulating the merits of the policy to the New Zealand public and to the international 
community.  Press conferences, media releases, interviews with individual members the 
media, debating in the House of Representatives, and speeches both abroad and in New 
Zealand enabled Lange to clarify the Government’s position on nuclear ship visits and its 
anti-nuclear policy.  Taking part in the Oxford Union debate and addressing the United 
Nations General Assembly are examples of Lange’s critical involvement in the crisis. 
 
Second, Lange met with high level officials from other countries.  Meetings took place 
with the Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke; the British Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher; the United Sates Ambassador to New Zealand, H. Munroe Browne; Australian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden; the British Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, Lady Young; and Chief of Defence Staff (designate) of the 
United Kingdom, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse.  However, the most 
important individual whom Lange met with was United States Secretary of State, George 
Shultz.  The two men met on a few occasions: Meetings took place in Wellington and 
New York in 1984 and in Manila in 1986.226 
 
Lange was by no means the only New Zealand political actor involved in the ANZUS 
dispute.  As can be expected of any Prime Minister, Lange was compelled to delegate a 
number of duties regarding the negotiations with the United States.  In 1985 Deputy 
Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, and senior Cabinet Minister, David Caygill, met with 
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 United States officials in the United States and New Zealand attempting to negotiate a 
way around the impasse.  Moreover, as noted in the preceding chapter, New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials also played a crucial role in negotiations with the 
United States.  The important role played by some of Lange’s primary advisors should 
also not be overlooked. 
 
Third, as Prime Minister, Lange was responsible for leading the debate on the ANZUS 
issue within Cabinet.  As was noted in the preceding chapter, the extent to which Lange 
carried out this function at the critical time of the Buchanan request is in dispute.  
However, given that issues pertaining to foreign affairs were Lange’s area of 
responsibility, his was the leading voice on the issue of nuclear ship visits and ANZUS.  
 
Lastly, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lange introduced the anti-nuclear legislation into 
the House on 10th December 1985.  Lange outlined the provisions of the New Zealand 
Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill, articulating its purpose, 
function and form.  Lange answered questions regarding the legislation from Opposition 
Members of Parliament in the House and from the media.   
 
Conclusion 
As has been established, Lange was significantly involved in the ANZUS dispute and in 
efforts to reconcile New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy with the United States’ policy of 
NCND.  The dispute can be categorised as one of crisis.  It was an unprecedented state of 
affairs, requiring high level participation by Lange as Prime Minister and Minister of 
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 Foreign Affairs.  Moreover, Lange worked within wide decision parameters and was 
compelled to define the situation at hand.  As a consequence, his personality undoubtedly 
played a decisive role in the proceedings. 
 
The following chapter explores the personal characteristics found in the second section of 
Hermann’s framework.  Thus, Lange’s beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal 
style will be examined and the manner in which they affected the ANZUS dispute 
investigated.  
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 CHAPTER 7 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: BELIEFS, MOTIVES, 
DECISION STYLE AND INTERPERSONAL STYLE 
 
According to Hermann’s model, the personal characteristics that are most relevant to a 
political leader’s role in the foreign policy making process include: beliefs; motives; 
decision style and interpersonal style.227  A leader’s view of the world is shaped by their 
beliefs and motives and their personal political style is formed by their decision-style and 
interpersonal style.  As noted in Chapter 2, beliefs entail a leader’s fundamental 
assumptions of the world.  A leader’s motives refer to the desires that activate them, such 
as the need for power or approval.  A leader’s beliefs and motives will shape their view 
of the political process and, thus, help determine their agenda for their term in office.  
Decision style is comprised of a leader’s preferred methods of making decisions.  The 
styles and strategies a leader employs when making a political decision constitute an 
individual’s decision style.  As an example: a leader may prefer to make decisions in a 
collegial environment rather than in a dictatorial manner.  Lastly, interpersonal style 
refers to the characteristic ways in which a leader interacts with other policy makers.  A 
leader’s preference to be open and frank with colleagues is one example of an 
interpersonal style.  David Lange’s beliefs, motives, decision style an interpersonal style 
will now be examined.       
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 Beliefs 
In determining the composition of Lange’s beliefs due regard must be paid to the 
circumstances which gave rise to the formation of his fundamental assumptions about the 
world.  In order to analyse his political and philosophical beliefs, Lange’s childhood and 
education will be examined, as will his world experience prior to entering politics.  It 
should be noted that Lange’s childhood and education also inherently influenced the 
development of his motives.  The beliefs he accumulated over these years which he 
subsequently took with him into government will be uncovered.  An examination of the 
circumstances that gave rise to his political career and the beliefs that he demonstrated 
once in office will assist in painting a comprehensive picture of who Prime Minister 
David Lange was.228   
 
David Lange’s childhood and education 
David Lange was born on 4th August 1942 in Otahuhu, the first child of Dr Roy Lange, a 
traditional family doctor, and his wife, Phoebe.  Otahuhu was a small industrial town 
where the majority of town men were employed at the brewery or the railway workshops 
or the abattoir or one of the three freezing works and, with few exceptions, every woman 
stayed at home unless she was a nurse or a school teacher.229  As his biographer, Vernon 
Wright wrote: “Lange …grew up in a liberal Christian household where the twin 
injunctions of charity and duty kept the parents busy in the service of others.  You were 
                                                 
228 Blondel has noted: “Thus there is little doubt that demographic variables, from background to career, 
constitute a significant element in the extent to which leaders can exercise certain skills …”  J. Blondel, 
Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis (London; Beverly Hills, 1987), p.145 
229 D. Lange, My Life, (Auckland, 2005), p.21 
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 in a sense defined by what you did for others.”230  The Lange children were encouraged 
to be talkative, funny, and play competitive word games: at this, the oldest of the Lange 
children excelled. 
 
Roy Lange was known as “a bit of a left” and took his elder son to a number of political 
meetings to hear the great issues of the early 1950s, including the waterfront lockout and 
the Korean War, strongly debated.231  Lange’s passion for public speaking grew as did 
his enthusiasm for world affairs, travel and politics.  From an early age, he listened 
parliamentary broadcasts.  In his autobiography, Lange wrote:     
to 
                                                
I listened every night it was on, all the way through secondary school, and was always on the Labour 
side.  It was not because Pop voted Labour or because many of the families I knew supported Labour; it 
was because Labour was for the underdog and I hated the National Party for its smugness and 
arrogance.232 
 
Lange’s formal education included Otahuhu Kindergarten, Fairburn Road School, Otara 
Intermediate School, Otahuhu College, and Auckland University.  Throughout his 
schooling, Lange consistently performed below capacity.  It was not until completing his 
Master of Laws with First Class Honours at Auckland University in 1970 that the 
potential of his high IQ was realised.   
 
A defining characteristic of Lange’s schooling years which would have a lasting effect on 
his personality and, later, his political experience was his physical size.  From an early 
age, Lange was grossly overweight.  In his school years, Lange learnt to use humour to 
 
230 V. Wright, David Lange: Prime Minister (Wellington, 1984), p.122 
231 I. F. Grant, Public Lives: New Zealand’s Premiers and Prime Ministers 1856-2003 (Wellington, 2003), 
p.159 
Lange’s grandfather also was a member of the Labour Party, joining its Thames branch in 1917. 
232 Lange (2005), p.47-48 
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 deflect the cutting remarks made by children about his weight.  “‘Different’ is a word a 
lot of people use to describe David Lange at school, and in later life.  It is clear that his 
size is central to this, and he was to acknowledge years later that his size was a major 
reason for his rapid rise in politics.”233    
 
Lange’s size was not his only conspicuous personal characteristic.  At Otahuhu College, 
he came to be known for his quick wit and his ability as a public speaker.234  It was 
during a class talk that Lange first announced his political ambitions.  He informed his 
intermediate class that he was either going to be Prime Minister of New Zealand or an 
engine driver.   
 
Lange’s beliefs and his working life prior to entering politics 
Lange supported himself financially at university by working at a freezing works over the 
summer holidays.  Lange described the working conditions as “appalling” and said he 
could not help but identify with his fellow workers.235  He also worked on a part-time 
basis whilst studying law part-time as a clerk in a law firm, which was unconventionally 
committed to acting for the less privileged and protesters against apartheid, Vietnam and 
the nuclear arms race.236   
As a graduate, Lange commenced employment as a law clerk; initially working for 
Haigh, Charters and Carthy.  It was around this time that Lange also started travelling; 
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 visiting the United Kingdom and Asia.  Whilst in London, he met and married his first 
wife, Naomi. 
 
Lange and his new wife settled in Auckland and, after completing his Masters degree, he 
commenced employment as a lawyer.  He took over a retiring lawyer’s practice.  Lange’s 
law office predominately handled criminal cases and he increasingly became regarded as 
a “poor man’s lawyer”, representing the poorest and least-likely-to-pay clients.237  The 
great bulk of Lange’s work was done on legal aid and he noted that he “ended up with the 
people who found the system too big a challenge.”238  His practice “brought [him] into 
contact with the run-of-the-mill human failings which arose from drunkenness, disorder 
and domestic disharmony.”239  Indeed, the Christian ideals of working in the service of 
others, instilled in him by his parents, appear to have played an important role in this 
aspect of his life, as did his affiliation with the underdog.  
 
Lange’s beliefs and early political activities 
Lange became a father for the first time in May 1971 after the birth of his son, Roy.240  
Byron followed in March 1974 as did Emily in May 1976.  Whilst becoming a family 
man, Lange was also increasingly participating in political activities.  He had earlier 
joined the Labour Party in 1963 and later became the chairman of the Council for Civil 
Liberties.  He remained on the political periphery until he contested the seat vacated by 
Michael Bassett, his distant cousin, on the Auckland City Council in 1974.  He was 
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 unsuccessful but not discouraged.  At the 1975 election, Lange unsuccessfully contested 
the safe National seat of Hobson.  Lange was finally victorious after seeking selection for 
the safe Labour seat of Mangere in the 1977 by-election.241  Lange’s booming voice, 
confidence and quick wit ensured he romped home with an impressive majority.   
 
Lange’s decision to enter politics stems from his frustration with his predominately 
reactive role as a lawyer.242  Indeed, Lange believed the ‘system’ was failing his clients. 
Lange’s biographer has noted: 
If, like David Lange, you have for years picked people up at the bottom of the cliff, the exercise will 
probably after a time begin to seem futile, and you may feel that your best efforts should be directed 
towards building a fence at the top – that is to say, towards political activity.243  
 
A belief in needing to come to the aid of the vulnerable certainly appears to be a driving 
force behind Lange’s desire to enter politics.  It has been noted that Lange simply wanted 
people to be given “a fair go”.244  His brother, Peter Lange, wrote shortly before Lange’s 
death in 2005 that he regarded his brother’s main characteristics as being “a sense of 
compassion, a sense of adventure and a sense of humour.”245  Even Lange’s critics 
acknowledged that he was “a genuinely good-hearted man with strong feelings of social 
concern.”246  
 
                                                 
241 The Hobson seat had been vacated by Labour MP, Colin Moyle, after being accused by Prime Minister 
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 Examination of Lange’s maiden speech to the House will also assist in explaining the 
beliefs that led to his entering the political scene.  In it he described his politics as 
“democratic socialism”.  Lange’s speech also highlighted his sense of compassion for the 
under-privileged.  When speaking of his electorate, Mangere, and the challenges it faces 
he notes: 
The concern that I have is that in my electorate there are some people under desperate stress.  That 
stress arises from their present inability to provide sufficient [sic] for themselves and their families to 
live adequately.247  
 
 
Lange addressed the role of Parliament and its duty to New Zealand society as a whole: 
I believe that our challenge is to create a society where people feel committed to each other, where they 
have an interdependence which no adversity can force apart, where they realise they have a duty to their 
brothers, and where the fruits of such society are seen in the love, the charity, and the compassion of 
people, because, unless we elect to take that course, we must take the course of doing it by 
legislation.248 
 
Lange also stated: 
I invite members to reflect …to see whether this House has led the country to a new plateau of security 
and achievement or whether, somewhere on that slippery slope, we might be putting the millstones 
around the necks of the children in our society.249 
 
 
Celebrating life and the inherent worth of oneself are also beliefs Lange has been noted to 
have had.250 Shortly before the 1984 election, Lange was quoted as saying: 
I don’t surrender any of the optimism that I think should mark our vitality as people.  I think there is no 
inevitability of disaster, of pessimism, that people have for too long simply talked about life after death.  
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 I think it comes back much closer to home.  I’m prepared to leave the metaphysical aspects of it beyond, 
but I think that you have to seize that sense of worth of life, of one’s uniqueness.251 
 
Lange’s belief in the role of Government to provide the means of achieving a successful 
and just society is apparent, as is his concern for the disadvantaged.  The Christian 
socialist ideals he was brought up with helped form a sense of community service and 
comprise the basis of his political belief system.   
 
Lange’s beliefs demonstrated in the course of the ANZUS dispute 
Lange’s maiden speech propelled him into national prominence.  Two years later, in 
November 1979, he won the deputy leadership over incumbent Bob Tizard.  Through the 
efforts of others in the Labour Party, mainly by Auckland colleagues, Lange became 
party leader in February 1983.  Just over a year later, in July 1984, Lange became Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Upon assuming the office of Prime Minister, Lange was personally against nuclear 
weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence.  However, the extent of Lange’s belief 
regarding nuclear matters is in dispute.  In interviews with this author, former Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mervyn Norrish; former Head of the Prime Minister’s 
Department, Mr. Gerald Hensley; former Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, Dr. 
John Henderson; former Press Secretary to Lange, Mr. Ross Vintner; and former senior 
Cabinet Ministers, Rt. Hon. Mike Moore and Hon. David Caygill all stated that Lange 
was personally committed to the Labour Party’s anti-nuclear policy.   
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 It should be noted that former Secretary of Defence, Mr. Denis McLean and former Chief 
of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson, believed otherwise. McLean asserts 
that evidence such as the authorisation of Jamieson visiting Hawaii to discuss a possible 
ship to be sent, suggests Lange was indeed not personally committed to the policy.  
Furthermore, Jamieson contends that Lange’s commitment fluctuated.  Whilst he 
believed Lange’s inclination was always to shun nuclear weapons and question the merits 
of nuclear power, he was not committed to the extent that he was prepared to risk his 
political prospects.   
 
Lange has stated that he simply took it for granted that Labour would ban nuclear 
weapons from entering New Zealand as soon as it was elected.252  “It seemed wrong for a 
country like New Zealand to play host to nuclear missiles, even if they came on ships full 
of recreationally minded sailors.”253  His aversion to nuclear weapons and the nuclear 
arms race took centre stage in many of his speeches.  He often commented on the 
irrationality and immorality of the concept of nuclear deterrence.  At the Oxford Union 
debate, Lange argued: “Nuclear weapons make us insecure, and to compensate for our 
insecurity we build and deploy more nuclear weapons …we know that we are seized by 
irrationality and yet we persist.”254  Moreover, he contended: “Rejecting nuclear weapons 
is to assert what is human over the evil nature of the weapon; it is to restore to humanity 
the power of decision; it is to allow true moral force to reign supreme.”255   
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 However, Lange held a different belief about nuclear propulsion.  Indeed, only a few 
weeks after gaining the leadership of the Labour Party, Lange unsuccessfully attempted 
to alter its anti-nuclear policy so as to allow for visits of nuclear-propelled ships.  He 
believed that “a stand against the arms race was the legitimate concern of foreign 
policy.”256  Lange could not see how the arguments for banning nuclear weapons could 
be properly applied to nuclear propulsion:  “If we continued to lock propulsion and 
weapons together and did not distinguish them, I was not sure how I could persuade the 
United States of the essential rationality of our policy.”257  Subsequently, in his speeches, 
Lange focused on the global threat of nuclear weapons and their proliferation as opposed 
to nuclear-powered and armed vessels. 
   
Commentators on the ANZUS dispute have asserted that there was some anti-American 
sentiment within the Labour Party, which helped consolidate the break with the United 
States.  Former Cabinet Minister, Michael Bassett, has contended that “[m]ore than a 
touch of anti-Americanism can be discerned within Labour’s growing nuclear stance.”258  
However, it has been argued that Lange did not share this belief.  Henderson has 
commented that not only did Lange not harbour anti-American sentiment, rather, he held 
America in high regard.259  Moreover, given the Cold War mentality that existed at the 
time of the ANZUS dispute, Lange was well aware of the need for American global 
strength.  In light of this, in his Oxford Union speech, Lange acknowledged the role 
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 America, as a nuclear super-power, played in ensuring peace in Western Europe: “I freely 
acknowledge that the nuclear deterrent is maintained in good conscience with the 
honourable intention of preserving the life and freedom of the people of Western 
Europe.”260  
 
Another political belief Lange demonstrated whilst handling the foreign affairs portfolio, 
is the notion that a small state has the same sovereign right as a large state to implement 
policy.  Despite how infuriated the United States Administration became with New 
Zealand, Lange firmly believed that the Government had every right to continue 
implementing its anti-nuclear policy.  He argued at Oxford: “[t]o compel an ally to accept 
nuclear weapons against the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of 
totalitarianism, which allows for no self-determination.”261  Lange’s affinity for the 
underdog had been taken to a higher level.   
 
Motives 
A complete analysis of Lange’s leadership style and its effect on the ANZUS dispute 
requires examination, not only of his fundamental beliefs, but also, of the desires that 
activated him.  The underlying motives that led Lange into a political career will now be 
examined.   
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 Uncovering the primary motivational factors in Lange’s political career has been the 
focus of a number of studies produced by Henderson.262  As the Director of the Advisory 
Group to Lange, Henderson was able to view Lange at close proximity as Prime Minister 
on a day-to-day basis.  During his career as a political scientist, Henderson has applied 
James Barber’s framework in categorising Lange’s political motivation.  As noted in 
Chapter 1, Barber’s typology consists of two variables: a leader’s participation in politics 
(how much energy they devote to politics), and how they feel about their political life.263  
These variables allow the leader to be placed into one of four character types: active-
positive, active-negative, passive-positive and passive-negative.  A motivational force 
accompanies each character type.  Henderson has identified Lange as a passive-positive 
leader and therefore, concludes that the search for approval and affection characterise his 
political motivations.  Utilising Barber’s variables and determining Lange’s political 
activity levels and his attitude towards his political role will greatly assist in determining 
Lange’s motivational make-up and thus fulfil this section of Hermann’s model. 
 
Lange’s political activity level 
Lange did not devote all his energy to politics as some “active” leaders do.  He has even 
been criticised as being lazy: a contention strongly disputed by Henderson.264  Lange is 
also remembered by his other advisors as not being a lazy man.  In terms of foreign 
policy, Hensley has stated that Lange devoted however much time was necessary to tasks 
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 at hand.265  Norrish shares a similar opinion: he has stated that as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Lange gave the portfolio its due.266   
 
However, Lange’s ability to quickly get bored of a subject is well documented.  Harvey 
McQueen asserts that because of Lange’s “quickness of intellect, he switched off if he 
was getting bored, hence he had a reputation for inattention and rudeness.”267  It has also 
been contended that “Lange was cursed by a mind so restless it needed continual protean 
stimulus to ward off boredom.”268  Henderson also notes that Lange was ill at ease in 
formal occasions and often felt trapped by the protocol of the seating arrangements.269 
 
Lange’s energy levels are best described as wide ranging.  Indeed, Lange has 
acknowledged his inclination to work in fits and starts: 
There were days of crisis when I would have worked more than twenty hours.  There were other days, I 
would have worked, formally about four hours.  And there were some days when I would deal with 
questions, lie down on the couch, and go to sleep in the office.”270 
 
Not surprisingly, Lange’s working style was best suited to times of crisis.  His ability to 
rise to the occasion has been noted as one of his strengths.271   
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 Of significance to the assessment of Lange’s level of activity is the fact that it was 
through the efforts of others that he was elevated to the leadership of the Labour Party.  
Lange was promoted by a group of mainly Auckland colleagues, led by Roger Douglas.    
Henderson notes that Lange took pride knowing that he never engaged in aggressive self-
promotion.272  His attitude towards political manoeuvring is telling about his political 
motivations.  This aspect of Lange’s leadership will now be analysed. 
 
Lange’s attitude towards politics 
Barber’s second variable consists of asking the question: does the leader enjoy his 
political life?  Henderson concludes that Lange enjoyed the political stage and regarded 
politics in a positive light.  Therefore, Lange is characterised as a “passive-positive”.273  
According to Barber, passive-positives are drawn to politics through their need to attract 
the approval of others and their search for affection.  They revel in performing for people 
and the drama of politics.  This characterisation aptly applies to Lange.  His love of press 
conferences, television interviews and televised debates is widely acknowledged.274  
Lange used these as a means of demonstrating his quick wit and superior oratorical skills.  
The Oxford Union debate arguably provided Lange with his greatest opportunity to gain 
widespread approval and affection.  Jon Johansson has noted: “Oxford was also high 
theatre and in that type of forum Lange was superlative.”275  Former senior Cabinet 
Minister, David Caygill, regards Lange’s greatest strength as being “the combination of 
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 his intelligence and his quickness of wit and his intuitive feel for people in situations and 
his expressive language.”276  Furthermore, Vintiner has commented: “Lange was one of 
those people who events came to him.  Lange was like a hive and all the bees came to 
him.  And, like Queen Bee he was able to perform.”277   
 
Whilst many enjoyed Lange’s dramatic abilities, some criticised his famous one-liners as 
being personal and cruel.278  Political columnist, Colin James, at a parliamentary 
conference last year, commented that whilst Lange could be warm and friendly, he could 
also be quite cutting and vengeful.279  Moreover, in a 1987 article in the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Lange was described as “the lip with the quip”.  It goes on to argue 
that many of his comments work against him as they are often too esoteric and 
unintelligible to the ordinary person and at times are cruel.280  Lange’s labelling of the 
group of New Zealand former military chiefs who expressed their concerns about the 
government’s anti-nuclear policy as “geriatric generals” illustrates this point.281  As does 
Lange’s parting remark to retiring American Ambassador H. Munroe Brown that he must 
be the only Ambassador who owned a horse named after his country’s foreign policy: 
Lacka Reason.282   
 
Lange’s penchant for performing for an audience also had policy implications and 
affected the stand-off with the United States.  Norrish, noted in an interview with this 
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 author, that when asked a particular question during a press conference, Lange often had 
a quick answer which didn’t always square with the policy his colleagues or advisors 
wanted to follow.283  Many of the impassioned speeches Lange gave regarding his 
Government’s anti-nuclear policy, infuriated United States officials and served to 
diminish the likelihood of reaching a solution to the dispute.  Indeed, the detrimental 
affect of a speech given by Lange in Christchurch in 1985 was the subject of conversation 
during a meeting between Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, and Australian 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans in October 1985.  Having been 
briefed by Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, on his meeting with United States Secretary of 
State, George Shultz, Evans informed Palmer of the strong response in Washington to 
Lange’s speech and the subsequent hardening of the American attitude toward New 
Zealand.284   
 
John Henderson, the Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, has remarked on how the 
United States viewed Lange as often making jokes about nuclear deterrence, which in 
their eyes was a most serious and sombre concept.285  The Oxford Union debate and the 
comment made by Lange to an American interjector to “please hold your breath. I can 
smell the uranium on it”, was arguably the greatest affront to the American sensibilities.  
Lange has acknowledged the slight felt by the United States after making that remark: 
The one thing the Americans never forgave me for was that interjection.  That was deemed by them to 
have been a terrible slight in the relationship and it says something for my inability to understand what 
American sensitivies are about.286 
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 As has been demonstrated, the language employed by Lange impacted negatively on the 
ANZUS dispute.  When asked during an interview with this author if a different Labour 
Prime Minister would have meant a different outcome on the ANZUS issue, Caygill 
responded by saying it quite possibly could have:  “If the personalities had been different 
the language might have been slightly different, the impression might have been different 
and the relationship might have been different.”287  Whilst rhetoric enabled Lange to gain 
affection from international audiences it also proved to be costly in terms of the 
relationship between New Zealand and the United States. 
 
Whilst passive-positives, such as Lange, gain pleasure from their political careers, they 
loathe situations involving conflict and disharmony which are an inevitable part of the 
political process.  It is widely acknowledged that Lange was extremely adverse to conflict 
on a personal level.  As has already been noted, he was not prepared to aggressively 
pursue his own political promotion.  Former advisor to Lange, Chris Laidlaw, has 
asserted: 
Lange would go to almost any length to avoid confrontation and was forever ducking out through the 
rear entrance of his office to escape the clutches of angry ministers.  He treated cabinet and caucus in 
the same perennially elusive.  He seemed especially evasive when any of Labour’s stroppier women 
were trying to run him to ground.288  
 
Bassett, noted Lange’s aversion of confrontation in a speech delivered at Georgetown 
University in December 2002.  He also commented that Helen Clark observed to him the 
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 “Lange always took the line of least resistance.”289  Similarly, Hensley has also noted that 
Lange strongly disliked confronting people.290  
 
It has been suggested that Lange’s distaste for conflict and disharmony led him to 
withdraw to the Tokelaus thus avoiding the situation surrounding the American request 
for a naval visit.  Jamieson has asserted that Lange wished to avoid being at the centre of 
a cabinet row over the Buchanan and having to deal will the more fervent anti-nuclear 
supporters: MP Helen Clark, Party President, Margaret Wilson and Lange’s speech writer 
(a later second wife), Margaret Pope.  Therefore, “he deliberately withdrew from the 
scene, incommunicado in the Tokelaus.”291  This opinion is shared by former Secretary 
of Defence, Denis McLean, who has stated that “rather than face the radicals on the issu
down he went off on a holiday.”
e 
                                                
292 
 
Lange’s Press Secretary, Ross Vintiner, briefed the Prime Minister on the developments 
in the Buchanan fiasco on his way home from the Tokelaus and has a different 
interpretation of the situation with which Lange was confronted.  He has contended that 
Lange’s trip to the Tokelaus was pre-planned the previous year and he was honour bound 
to go.  Lange was unaware of the exact date that a request from the United States would 
come, but when it did he “quite wisely went away to get some space around the issue.”293 
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 Whilst Lange loathed confrontation on a personal level, his execution of the anti-nuclear 
policy brought him into deep conflict with the United States.  In response to Bassett’s 
argument, Lange has asserted that “it’s illogical to suggest that someone who didn’t like 
confrontation would deliberately take on a fight with the United States.”294  Henderson 
has contended that the policy Lange was pursuing inevitably involved confrontation with 
the world’s superpower.  Had Lange solely sought to avoid conflict, he would have found 
a compromise formula.295  Indeed, in articulating New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy to its 
allies, Lange had to endure a number of confrontational, even hostile, meetings. In his 
memoirs, Lange recalled his first official meeting with British Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher: “We had talks, but we did not have a conversation.  She expressed forthright 
opposition to the nuclear-free policy and had no interest in anything short of our 
capitulation.”296 
 
Evidently, Lange was a political leader who revelled in the performance aspect of 
politics.  Gaining the approval and affection of others were his primary motivations 
during his first term as Prime Minister.  However, as power is a fundamental aspect of 
politics, the extent to which Lange was motivated by power needs to be addressed. 
 
As has been noted, Lange was not attracted to a career in the legal profession by the 
material gains it could provide.  The same is true of the desires that compelled him to 
enter politics.  Various commentators have contended that Lange was not materialistic.  
Former senior Cabinet Minister, Mike Moore, has said: “David has a sort of Gandhi-like 
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 attitude which I admire and love.  He’s the least materialistic person I know.”297  Lange 
has been praised for taking on no airs and graces and remaining “utterly unaffected by the 
trappings and flatteries of office.”298   
 
Whilst Lange must have harboured some personal ambitions upon entering politics, the 
desire for power was not his primary motivation.  Lange has acknowledged “that the 
possibility of becoming a leader raises questions about personal ambition and personal 
power, but [said] categorically that these are not central for him.”299  Lange’s brother, 
Peter, has asserted that while Lange probably likes power he is not greedy for it.300   
 
Decision Style 
Over the course of Lange’s first term as Prime Minister, he had to make a number of 
difficult decisions regarding New Zealand’s foreign policy; arguably the decision to 
reject the Buchanan was the most demanding.  However, it should be remembered that he 
was operating within a system of cabinet government which did affect, to some extent, 
the strategies open to Lange when making a decision.  Lange’s leadership of Cabinet has 
been described by his deputy, Geoffrey Palmer, as a “chairman of the board” approach.301  
Palmer remembered Cabinet meetings in the first term of office as being very collegial 
and cooperative.302  Cabinet under the Fourth Labour Government did not operate on a 
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 system of vote-taking.303  Policy decisions were never made through taking a vote at 
Cabinet.  Under Lange’s leadership, Cabinet decisions were reached through a 
deliberative process.  Lange’s Press Secretary, Ross Vintiner, asserts that this approach to 
running Cabinet was very much a deliberate decision on Lange’s part.304  However, 
former Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, Gerald Hensley, has suggested that 
Lange’s preference for chairing Cabinet may in fact be a result of his dislike of 
confrontational situations.305 
 
Lange’s decision style with regards to Cabinet stands in stark contrast to that of his 
predecessor, Robert Muldoon.  Muldoon’s leadership of Cabinet can only be described as 
autocratic.  Deliberation in a cooperative environment certainly did not characterise the 
preceding National Cabinet.  Labour Cabinet Minister, Michael Bassett, has commented 
that the majority of ministers liked Lange’s style in Cabinet and “most ministers felt they 
had time adequately to discuss strategy in Cabinet.”306  Moreover, Palmer has noted that 
Lange gave ministers a lot of leeway in running their portfolios.307  Caygill shares this 
view and has stated that Lange “gave people jobs and left them to get on with them.”308  
 
However, Lange has been criticised for not fully disclosing crucial issues of foreign 
policy to Cabinet, such as the diplomatic negotiations with the United States regarding 
port access.  Bassett asserts that Cabinet was never fully informed about the request for 
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 the Buchanan to visit so was not able to make an informed decision.309  This argument is 
supported by Hensley, who, whilst being interviewed by this author, commented that he 
later discovered that Lange “really had not discussed with any of his colleagues 
…anything about the Buchanan affair.”310  Indeed, Lange has admitted that he confided 
only in his deputy, Geoffrey Palmer and third-ranked minister, Mike Moore, about the 
secret diplomatic negotiations with the United States.311  Not even Associate Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Frank O’Flynn, was privy to the developments regarding the Buchanan.  
Given these circumstances, it can be argued that deciding to visit the Tokelaus 
immediately after receiving the request for the Buchanan was a questionable decision to 
make.  Cabinet was expected to discuss and make a decision about circumstances they 
had little, if any, knowledge of.   
 
Consequently, Lange has been criticised for avoiding making difficult decisions.  His 
visit of the Tokelaus has been used by his critics to illustrate this point.  Former Secretary 
of Defence, Denis McLean, has argued that in trying to resolve the ANZUS crisis, Lange 
allowed problems to accumulate and was therefore unable to manage the decision-making 
process.  He points to Lange “taking off on holiday” to the Tokelaus as evidence of 
this.312  Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervyn Norrish, also notes that when 
Lange came up against a difficult issue, one which required him to make a firm decision 
one-way-or-another, Lange tended to sidestep it.313  Moreover, former Chief of Defence 
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 Staff, Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson, regards Lange as having lacked the “resolution or 
firmness of command to handle the kind of international and national security crisis as 
represented by [the ANZUS dispute] that confronted New Zealand in the mid-1980s.”314  
This argument is affirmed by Norrish who has commented that in his opinion Lange’s 
biggest weakness was his “indecisiveness and lack of settled convictions.”315     
 
However, Lange was by no means uninformed when making decisions regarding ANZUS 
and the anti-nuclear policy.  Advisors to Lange acknowledge that he ensured he was 
knowledgeable of the issues pertinent to the ANZUS dispute.  McLean has commented 
that when deciding on a course of action, Lange certainly sought advice from officials.316  
Both Hensley and Norrish have noted that Lange was receptive to advice proffered by his 
advisors, read the briefs prepared for him and was able to quickly understand the material 
presented.317 
 
Interpersonal Style 
As has been demonstrated, Lange’s decision style influenced the course the ANZUS 
dispute took. The way in which Lange interacted with his staff, advisors, colleagues and 
foreign officials will now be examined.     
 
Lange’s personal staff and advisors regard their time working for Lange in a favourable 
light.  Both Vintiner and Henderson have remarked that working for Lange was very 
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 enjoyable.318  Indeed, Lange was a leader who instilled a sense of loyalty in his staff.  
Henderson notes that Lange never reprimanded his staff but also refused to interact with 
those members of his staff whom he considered to be difficult.319  Lange’s aversion of 
confrontation was illustrative of his poor interpersonal skills.  Henderson also commented 
that rather than risk getting into an argument with a particular person, Lange would 
simply not talk to them.320 
 
Avoidance of conflict also permeated Lange’s relations with his public service advisors.  
In describing how he and Lange interacted, Jamieson, has commented:  “Lange 
recognised my right to present my views frankly, listened with intelligent interest, 
occasionally commented on the apparent logic of what I said but rarely committed 
himself to an explicit position or enter into a discussion of pros and cons.”321  Moreover, 
Hensley has recalled that Lange preferred the personal to the professional approach when 
handling people.322  Indeed, this interpersonal method of retaining a collegial atmosphere 
during discussions and not entering into one-on-one debates would have significantly 
reduced the likelihood of a conflict.  
 
One facet of Lange’s interpersonal relations that caused much controversy and 
resentment was his relationship with his speech writer, Margaret Pope.  Lange and Pope 
embarked on an extramarital affair not long after Lange became Prime Minister, in early 
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 1985.323  The extent of her influence over Lange as it translated into government policy 
has been widely debated.  Commentator, Simon Sheppard, has stated that “[n]otes from 
somewhere within the foreign affairs establishment taken in mid-1985 confirm that there 
was a great deal of concern felt within official circles about the role of Margaret 
Pope.”324     
Moreov
 
ngs than any cabinet ministers …[Pope] wrote, or re-wrote, 
ost every significant speech he delivered and was a major source of influence particularly on 
the issue of nuclear weapons.325  
n, 
ns, but 
 
.  
Po 5:  
er, former advisor to Lange, Chris Laidlaw, has contended: 
There was of course one woman in the Beehive who was never seen by the outside world but who
pulled more Prime Ministerial stri
alm
 
Vintiner, however, has remarked that the influence of Pope was not particularly important 
in terms of policy in the first term of government.326   Fellow Lange advisor, Henderso
believes Pope did have an influence over Lange which had political implicatio
believes she impacted on the style the anti-nuclear policy took rather than its 
substance.327  Pope made the relationship with the United States much more difficult 
because of the sometimes undiplomatic nature of some of her speeches.  Whilst Pope has
sometimes been referred to as Lange’s “left-wing conscience”328, Henderson is adamant 
that Lange did not require Pope to ensure he remained steadfast to the anti-nuclear policy
pe commented on this concern over her influence in an interview in November 200
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 David and I often talked about policy issues and I used to have quite firm views and I would have 
opinions.  He never needed anyone to tell him what was right and what was wrong, ever.
expressed them to him had I been simply his employee.  David encouraged people to express their 
hich infuriated the United States and made resolution of the ANZUS dispute all the 
 
nge and 
ashington.  Had Lange not enjoyed such a 
lose personal relationship with Pope, a resolution to the quarrel may have been 
 
n interview with this author Caygill asserted 
                                                
329   
However, the emotive anti-nuclear speeches penned by Pope and delivered by Lange, 
w
more impossible, have also been noted as being an instrumental factor by Norrish.330  
 
Lange’s relationship with Pope is one of the most controversial aspects of his time as 
Prime Minister.  The evidence suggests that the speeches she wrote exacerbated the 
situation with the United States.  These speeches encouraged the performer in La
were cause for considerable irritation in W
c
forthcoming. 
 
Lange’s relationship with Pope concerned many of his political colleagues.  Stan
Rodgers, the Minister of Labour in the Fourth Labour Government, stated in a 
parliamentary conference in 2004 that Pope significantly influenced Lange.331  
Furthermore, Russell Marshall, the Minister of Education, has been quoted as saying: 
“The real decisions were being made by those other two [Lange and Pope] and none of us 
were ever privy to that.”332  However, in a
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 that “I am not impressed with the argument that Margaret had a significant influence o
David in a policy sense at any stage.”
ver 
ict 
 
 angry.  Not at all!”334  Bassett is also critical of 
ange’s poor interpersonal skills.  He believes Lange’s inability to confront opponents 
ith 
  Moore remarked 
 this author that working with Lange was “great fun.”337  However, whilst working with 
h 
                                                
333  
 
Regardless of the question of his relationship with Pope, some of Lange’s colleagues 
regarded his interpersonal skills as lacking.  His strong disliking of interpersonal confl
lead Marshall to the conclusion that: “David was always better at dealing with people en
masse than he was an individual …He couldn’t cope with the one-on-one discussion at 
all, especially if the other person was
L
contributed to his failure to effectively lead the Labour Party and secure an acceptable 
outcome to the ANZUS dispute.335   
 
Other of Lange’s colleagues remember with fondness their experiences of working w
him.  Palmer regarded Lange as being “very easy to get along with.”336
to
Lange may have been enjoyable for some in the Government, Lange’s poor people 
management skills have been shown to be problematic for others.     
 
Lange’s weak interpersonal relations were also apparent in his dealings with foreign 
officials during the course of the ANZUS dispute.  Lange’s infamous 1984 meetings wit
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 United States Secretary of Defence, George Shultz, provide a striking example of 
Lange’s poor interpersonal skills.  Whilst it has been confirmed Lange did not indicate to 
Shultz that he would be able to reverse the government’s anti-nuclear policy within si
months
x 
hat 
 
off the inevitable, thus demonstrating his non-
ommittal and indecisive character.  As was noted in Chapter 4, the two meetings that 
 relations with Australian Prime Minister, Bob 
awke.  In his memoirs, Lange described their relationship as “strained”.340  Norrish, has 
ange regarded Hawke as being patronising and, to some extent, a bully; to 
 
                                                
338, Lange’s aversion of confrontation arguably led to him suggesting that the 
Americans place a ship request in the usual manner.  He would have been fully aware t
the United States would not want to request a naval visit only to have it declined.  In
buying time, Lange was simply putting 
c
took place between Lange and Shultz in 1984 coloured Shultz’s view of Lange and 
hindered subsequent negotiations.339    
 
Lange also did not enjoy favourable
H
recalled how L
which Lange did not react well.341 
 
Conclusion  
Lange was brought up with a sense of duty to the community and, in particular, the 
disadvantaged.  Frustrated with his primarily reactive role as a lawyer, Lange decided to
enter politics.  Lange was also motivated by the performance aspect of politics.  He 
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 revelled in the drama of the political process.  Whilst he strove for approval and affection 
from others, he keenly avoided confrontational situations, often resorting to hum
alleviate hostile situations.  Lange’s fondness for performing for an audience also 
our to 
had 
olitical implications and negatively affected the dispute with the United States.  Indeed, 
ct 
he 
ashington.  Lange ensured he was well informed of those issues 
ertinent to the Buchanan standoff and the ANZUS dispute, yet did not allow his Cabinet 
lied to 
he 
”: personal characteristics Hermann asserts affect the 
egree to which a leader’s personality can influence foreign policy behaviour.  
c ingly, Lange’s interest and training in foreign affairs and his sensitivity to his 
nvironment will be assessed. 
p
many of the speeches Lange gave concerning the anti-nuclear policy infuriated 
Washington and diminished the possibility of reaching a solution to the dispute.   
 
Lange’s personal political style is best described as poor.  While ensuring Cabinet 
meetings were collegial and allowing ministers room to move with their portfolios, 
Lange’s inability to involve himself in potentially confrontational situations and to a
decisively hindered the ANZUS dispute resolution process.  His relationship with Pope 
affected the work of other advisors and the undiplomatic character of the speeches s
authored goaded W
p
colleagues to do the same, whilst expecting them to make a decision regarding the 
American request. 
 
In Chapter 8 of this thesis, the final section of Hermann’s framework will be app
the case study of David Lange and his affect on the ANZUS dispute.  This portion of t
model is comprised of three “filters
d
A cord
e
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CHAPTER 8 
 
“FILTERS” - PERSONAL CHARATERISTICS: INTEREST 
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRAINING IN FOREIGN 
s 
an 
er’s 
ity to 
e political environment.  Hermann labels these three features “filters”.  These three 
David Lange and the extent to which these personal 
al 
ee of 
terest, the higher the degree of attention the leader will pay to foreign policy.  An 
                                                
AFFAIRS AND SENSITIVITY TO ENVIRONMENT 
 
The final section of Herman’s model is comprised of three further personal characteristic
which Hermann asserts affect the degree to which a leader’s personal characteristics c
have an impact on national foreign policy.342  These three characteristics are a lead
interest in foreign affairs, their training in foreign affairs, and their general sensitiv
th
filters will now be applied to 
characteristics affected the nuclear ships issue and the ANZUS dispute examined. 
 
Interest in Foreign Affairs 
Hermann asserts that without at least a general interest in foreign affairs, a politic
leader’s personal characteristics will have little effect.343  The higher the degr
in
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 interested leader will ensure they are consulted on decisions and kept abreast of 
developments in foreign affairs.  This variable will now be related to Lange. 
 
In his memoirs, Lange stated that he took the foreign affairs portfolio “because it 
interested [him] and because [he] knew it would be critical to the new government.”344 
Lange also wrote that he was attracted to the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs by th
international travel which accompanied the portfolio and the opportunity to meet the 
significant figures of the day.
e 
s 
sia was 
ess Lange 
ad of New Zealand needing to play a tangible role, as opposed to a merely a notional 
ar 
 
345  He was also concerned that he advance New Zealand’
interests in places where that had not traditionally been done.346  Lange was eager to 
build relationships with the emerging world.  For this reason, Lange visited places such 
as Africa, India, China, Indonesia and the Philippines.  Lange’s Press Secretary, Ross 
Vintiner, remarked to this author how Lange foresaw the enormous impact A
going to have on the global community.347  Vintiner also recalled the awaren
h
one, in the Pacific region.  Furthermore, he described Lange as being “very 
cosmopolitan” and remembered him following world affairs very closely.    
 
At the heart of the foreign affairs portfolio lay the Labour Government’s anti-nucle
policy.  Anti-nuclearism had long been an interest of Lange’s.  Whilst he did not join the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament or any other group formed to protest against nuclear
testing, Lange was drawn into the small active protest movement through his law 
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 studies.348  During the course of his employment at Haigh, Charters and Carthy, barris
and solicitors of Auckland, Lange would often be called on by the senior partner, Frank 
Haigh, to help distribute leaflets which denounced nuclear testing in the Pacific an
announced the times of rallies and marches.
ters 
d 
ot 
  
s with whom he came into contact as “reek[ing] of sincerity and 
oodness.”352  Lange’s regard for the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand is also 
f 
d Lange’s loathing of formal occasions when he was 
trapped” by the protocol of seating arrangements.354  Henderson also noted that whilst 
                                                
349  Lange wrote that although he did n
enjoy that part of his job he “thought enough of the cause not to spurn support for it.”350
He summed up his participation in the movement thus: “I delivered the leaflets, I 
marched in the rallies and I went to the meetings.”351  Indeed, Lange regarded the 
majority of protestor
g
evidenced in his legal representation of protestors charged for acts carried out in the 
course of protests.   
 
One aspect of foreign affairs that did not appeal to Lange was the formal aspect of 
representing New Zealand abroad.  Former Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, 
Gerald Hensley, has commented that Lange found the formality and ceremonial nature o
the foreign affairs role to be disagreeable.353  Similarly John Henderson, the Director of 
the Advisory Group to Lange, recalle
“
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 on official overseas visits, Lange’s preference was to spend time at fun parks rather than
attend formal VIP receptions.
 
 
ments 
 the negotiation process with the United States over the nuclear ships issue by the high-
.  Henderson contends that any errors Lange made during 
s 
  
4.    
 
                                                
355       
 
Despite his dislike of the formal aspect of foreign affairs, Lange continued to be keenly 
interested in the portfolio and the issue of nuclear ship visits and ANZUS.  It can be 
argued that his interest in this area helped ensure he was kept well abreast of foreign 
affairs developments.  He studiously read all the foreign affairs briefs prepared for him by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.356  Lange was also kept well informed of develop
in
ranking public service officials
the course of the ANZUS dispute were not the result of ignorance on his part.357 
 
Training in Foreign Affairs 
A leader’s training in foreign affairs prior to assuming their current office constitute
Hermann’s second “filter”.  Experience as a foreign minister, ambassador, or foreign 
affairs official meets Hermann’s definition of “training” in foreign affairs.  The leader 
with no previous experience has no personal expertise to draw upon ensuring little 
knowledge of what will succeed and fail in the international arena.  With training and/or 
experience comes a wider repertoire of possible foreign policy behaviours to consider. 
Lange had no training in foreign affairs prior to his election as Prime Minister in 198
Furthermore, similarly to many of his Cabinet colleagues, he had had no experience being
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 in Cabinet.  Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Lange was a lawyer and an opposition 
Member of Parliament.  Despite this, Henderson believes that Lange was quite well 
prepared for the foreign affairs role of Prime Minister upon assuming office.358  He not
that Lange was well read on international issues of the day and having travelled quite 
extensively in the past, had “an instinctive feel for foreign affairs.”
es 
t 
 Lange, Henderson also asserted that his expertise in foreign affairs 
eveloped rapidly.  Lange studiously studied the briefs that were prepared for him by the 
ls 
rime 
ted his 
f 
 
                                     
359  Having worked a
close quarters with
d
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and readily absorbed the material presented to him by his 
other advisors.     
 
However, it can be well contended that foreign affairs is a policy area that requires skil
that are primarily acquired through experience.  Whilst Lange may have had an instinct 
for foreign affairs and was well read in world affairs prior to assuming the office of P
Minister, many of his actions during the course of the ANZUS dispute highligh
lack of prior practical experience.  One such example includes Lange’s invitation to the 
United States to proceed with a ship request in the usual manner and authorising the 
secret diplomatic negotiations, whilst not informing his Cabinet colleagues o
developments.  This course of action ensured his Cabinet colleagues were ignorant of the 
vital issues surrounding the issue of American naval visits and contributed to the slight
felt by Washington when their request was met with a negative response.360 
            
assionate anti-American colleagues to 
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 Lange’s lack of foreign affairs training is evident in his decision to travel to the Tokela
during the course of the Buchanan crisis.  Lange chose to proceed with the schedul
visit in January despite receiving a diplomatic note from the American Embassy 
foreshadowing a request for a naval visit.  The American request for the Buchanan to
visit was the most crucial stage in the ANZUS dispute: for the first time, t
us 
ed 
 
he New 
ealand Government was applying its anti-nuclear policy; at stake was the more than 
.   
yn Norrish, points to Lange’s improvisation at press conferences 
hen discussing the Government’s foreign policy as illustrative of his inexperience: his 
gues 
th New 
Z
thirty year old alliance with the world superpower.   Leaving New Zealand merely 
ensured his uninformed colleagues had to manage the critical situation.   
 
Indeed Lange’s lack of training or previous experience in foreign affairs and its adverse 
effect on the ANZUS dispute has also been noted by some of his public service advisors
Hensley suggests that the inexperience of Lange and other ministers may have led them 
to underestimate the seriousness of the quarrel with Washington.361  Former Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, Merv
w
statements did not always square with the agreed policy line his advisors and collea
wished to follow.362   
 
Indeed, Lange’s lack of experience in foreign affairs explains, to some extent, the 
undiplomatic character of some of his speeches, which were met with much outrage in 
Washington.  Lange continually stated that the Government wished to retain bo
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 Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and its participation in the ANZUS alliance, but he 
continued to make remarks with which Washington took offence.  In particular, Lange
was aware of the undiplomatic nature of the speeches he gave to Labour Party 
conferences.  When questioned about them by officials he simply described them to hi
advisors a
also 
 
s 
s “party romps”, to which not much consideration should be given.363  
wever, these “party romps” were scrutinised by Washington and were a source of 
Lange’s inexperience 
as instrumental in the failure to resolve the dispute with the United States.  Had Lange 
was 
 
nor the foreign affairs portfolio.  Subsequent to his election on Saturday 14th July 1984, 
Ho
much frustration.  As noted in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo, the response in 
Washington to one such speech was to “[make] the United States position even more 
rigid.”364 
    
These examples demonstrate Lange’s limited repertoire of foreign policy responses; 
particularly at the time of the Buchanan crisis.  It can be seen that 
w
had more practical experience in foreign affairs he may have implemented a different 
series of decisions.  Consequently, the slight felt by the United States may have been 
avoided and a mutually acceptable solution to the impasse found. 
 
However, it should be noted that upon assuming the office of Prime Minister, Lange 
immediately thrust into the dispute with the United States over the nuclear issue.  He was
not afforded any time with which to come to terms with the position of Prime Minister 
                                                 
363 Interviews with Henderson, Norrish and Jamieson 
364 Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo, 17 October 1985; held at Archives NZ, Wellington; archives 
reference AAWW 7112 W4640/1 
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 Lange met with George Shultz in Wellington the following Tuesday.365  Despite the 
brevity of the meeting, Lange and his new Government’s anti-nuclear policy was thrust
into the spotligh
 
t.  Had Lange been afforded time to adjust to his new role and therefore 
ain a better appreciation of the requirements of foreign affairs, the extent of his foreign 
reased and allowed him to navigate the ANZUS dispute 
fects 
h an 
eader will adjust incoming stimuli to conform 
 their viewpoint, whilst the more sensitive political leader will adjust their views if 
listener.368  Moreover, he encouraged his advisors to explore different options.  
                                                
g
policy repertoire may have inc
more skilfully. 
 
Sensitivity to Environment 
The third personal characteristic is general sensitivity to one’s environment.  This af
“the consistency of the relationship between other characteristics and foreign policy.”366  
Hermann defines sensitivity to one’s environment as indicating “the extent to whic
individual is responsive to incoming stimuli from objects in the milieu in which he 
operates.”367  The less sensitive political l
to
incoming stimuli warrant such an adjustment.  This characteristic will now be applied to 
Lange and his role in the ANZUS crisis. 
 
The public service officials and personal staff who were involved most heavily in the 
nuclear ships issue and the ANZUS dispute regard Lange as having been an attentive 
 
365 Shultz was in New Zealand for the annual meeting of foreign ministers of the three ANZUS signatories.  
New Zealand was represented by Warren Cooper, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the outgoing National 
Government, as the incoming government was not due to be sworn in for another ten days and could not be 
eeting.  
ann, p.57 
 Hensley and Norrish 
represented at the m
366 Herm
367 ibid 
368 Interviews with Henderson,
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 Henderson has observed that generally Lange was open to advice, but was himself very
capable and very determined to
 
 weigh up advice against his own beliefs.369  Moreover, 
Vintiner has observed that the extent to which Lange would listen to advice depended 
upon the issue in question.370   
 
against the 
Govern
official
 
i ant complication in the 
alisation of an effective regional zone.  Whatever we might say in explanation of our policy, the 
 
371
 
 that 
sition to the Government’s anti-
uclear policy exasperated Lange and led to a strained relationship, particularly between 
                                                
Indeed, much of the advice Lange received from public service officials went 
ment’s anti-nuclear policy.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence 
s opposed the banning of nuclear-capable warships.  Lange recalled:   
My officials missed no chance to remind me of the harm they believed the nuclear-free policy was
already doing…Now officials warned us that we ‘should also be aware that the maintenance by 
New Zealand of a total and unqualified ban on port visits by vessels that are either nuclear-
powered or capable of carrying nuclear weapons may constitute a sign fic
re
United States and Australia …are likely to suspect that New Zealand’s long-term goal is to have
that policy adopted region-wide and incorporated in a regional zone.’   
 
In particular, Lange took issue with the advice tendered by the defence establishment:
“The advice I got from defence headquarters had a lot in common with the messages
came to me, directly and indirectly, from the American embassy.  The Americans, of 
course, put it a lot more bluntly.”372  Lange viewed the Ministry of Defence and the 
advice it proffered with much scepticism.  Its vocal oppo
n
Lange and the Secretary of Defence, Denis McLean.373 
 
 
369 Interview with Henderson 
370 Interview with Vintiner 
371 Lange (1990), p.66 
372 ibid, p.69 
373 Ibid 
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 It should be noted that the various articles of advice offered to Lange by his advisors 
were subject to political constraints.  The Labour Party, including the Executive an
parliamentary wing, was firm in its stand against allowing nuclear-capable vessels
New Zealand ports.  Henderson has observed that “Lange had to 
d the 
 into 
stay within the context 
f Labour thinking.”374  As evidence of this he points to Lange capitulating to the 
e Labour Party on the issue of nuclear propulsion.  Indeed, political 
of 
as 
rom 
clear ships issue.  
espite the adjustment of his viewpoint on nuclear-propulsion, Lange’s resolve did not 
                                                
o
majority of th
considerations necessitated readjustment of Lange’s viewpoint.  
 
Conclusion 
Lange had an interest in foreign affairs which ensured that he not only keep abreast 
developments but also played a key role in the execution of the Government’s key 
foreign policy: the anti-nuclear policy.  Lange’s lack of training and previous experience 
when tackling a number of key issues in the ANZUS dispute, most importantly the 
Buchanan incident, contributed to some poor decision making on his part, making 
navigation of the crisis more difficult.  Finally, it has been demonstrated that Lange w
sensitive to the political environment within which he was operating.  He was open to 
receiving advice, but ultimately political constraints, rather than advice he received f
officials, proved to be key in his adjusting his viewpoint on the nu
D
waiver on the issue of nuclear weaponry.  Lange did not regard incoming advice as 
warranting modification of his stand on the nuclear ships issue.   
 
 
374 Interview with Henderson  
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 In the concluding chapter of this th rawn from the application of 
Hermann’s framework to the case study of the 
NZUS dispute will be discussed.  The utility of the model for the assessment of the 
esis the conclusions d
affect of David Lange’s personality on the 
A
impact of a leader’s personality on a particular foreign policy will also be addressed.   
CHAPTER 9 
 
 
David Lange’s personality and leadership style have been shown to have had a significan
impact on the execution of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and the subsequent 
ANZUS dispute during his term as Prime Minister a
CONCLUSION 
t 
nd Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1984-
987.  Whilst he did not construct the anti-nuclear policy that formed the basis of the 
enced 
 
omprehensive analysis of the effect of Lange’s personality and correlating leadership 
  
                                                
1
ANZUS crisis, he was the key figure in its implementation and significantly influ
the course of events.  Moreover, the way in which Lange managed the impasse with the
United States has been the subject of much debate. 
 
The application of Margaret Hermann’s theoretical framework375 has enabled a 
c
style on the ANZUS crisis to be undertaken.  The situational factors with which Lange 
was confronted constituted the first set of variables to be considered in Hermann’s model.
Decision latitude, definition of the situation and participation comprise this section.   
 
 
375 M. G. Hermann, “Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy”, in Why 
Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, eds. M. A. East and S. A. 
Salmore (Beverly Hills, 1978) 
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 As has been demonstrated, Lange had wide decision-latitude within which to work.  Th
period within which Lange was managing the foreign policy crisis immediately followed 
his election victory.  He was a young, popular, newly elected Prime Minister and as s
was afforded a certain amount of political ‘capital’.  Accordingly, Lange was in a better 
position to a achieve policy change.   
Second, the nature of the ANZUS dispute was such that Lange was required, to some 
extent, to define it; thus allowing more scope for his personality to influence the course of
events.  The dispute with the United States was unprecedented and 
e 
uch 
 
as such, required 
ange to interpret the issues comprising the foreign affairs crisis.  He did so primarily by 
 
sis.  Lange met with a number of 
igh level officials from the United States, Australia and Britain to discuss the ANZUS 
L
way of numerous public speeches, in which clarified the New Zealand Government’s 
anti-nuclear policy and its views on ANZUS.  These public addresses and his superior 
oratorical skills enabled Lange to bring New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy to the world’s
attention in a manner no other of his contemporaries could match. 
 
Third, as both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lange was the political 
actor who participated most heavily in the ANZUS cri
h
dispute.  As the Government’s spokesperson, he also articulated the merits of the anti-
nuclear policy to the media and the international community.  As Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Lange was also responsible for introducing the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, 
Disarmament and Arms Control Bill into Parliament. 
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 The application of Hermann’s second set of variables enabled a detailed examination o
Lange’s personal characteristics to
f 
 be undertaken.  It was demonstrated that Lange was 
rought up with Christian ideals and a corresponding sense of duty to the community.  He 
hese aspects of Lange’s personality have been shown to have had a negative affect on 
 
ly 
involve conflict were demonstrated by Lange’s decision to travel to the Tokelaus at a 
b
identified with the disadvantaged and this contributed to his desire to enter politics.  Once 
in politics, Lange relished the performance aspect of the political process.  He 
endeavoured to gain the approval and affection of others and went to great lengths to 
avoid confrontational situations.   
 
T
the ANZUS dispute.  Numerous speeches Lange gave regarding New Zealand’s anti-
nuclear policy infuriated Washington and diminished the possibility of resolving the 
dispute.  Lange’s loathing of conflict manifested itself in his sometimes offensive 
humorous retorts. 
 
Lange’s personal political style was also examined in this second set of variables.  
Lange’s decision style and interpersonal style, which comprise his personal political 
style, were analysed and were shown to be lacking.  Lange was a likeable leader who 
ensured he was informed of all issues pertinent to the ANZUS dispute.  However, his 
inability to cope with confrontation impeded Lange’s ability to act decisively and 
prevented him from informing colleagues of critical developments in the ANZUS crisis. 
Indeed, Lange’s management of the Buchanan affair highlighted these weaknesses.  His 
poor judgement and inability to take a firm stand on an issue which would inevitab
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 time when an American request for a naval visit was imminent.  Furthermore, Lange’s 
personal relationship with his speech writer, Margaret Pope, hindered the work of oth
advisors.  The undiplomatic nature of a number of the speeches she authored caused 
Zealand officials much concern and served to further incense the United States.   
The final section of Hermann’s theoretical framework was concerned with three furthe
personal characteristics which were asserted to affect the degree to which a leader’s 
personal characteristics can have an impact on foreign policy.  Lange’s interest and 
training in foreign affairs and his sensitivity to his environment were analysed.  It was
demonstrated that L
er 
New 
r 
 
ange did have an interest in foreign affairs and, in particular, anti-
uclearism.  His decision to assume the foreign affairs portfolio and the enjoyment he 
ange’s lack of training and previous experience in foreign affairs did have a negative 
the 
inally, Lange was sensitive to the political environment within which he was working.  
n
evidently received from his role as Minister of Foreign Affairs illustrated this point.  
Consequently, Lange’s personality came to have more influence on the course of the 
ANZUS dispute.   
 
L
impact on the ANZUS issue.  In particular, his poor navigation of the Buchanan incident 
highlighted this deficiency.  Furthermore, Lange’s cavalier attitude to the dispute with 
United States may be due, in part, to his lack of prior experience in foreign affairs.  
 
F
He was open to receiving advice from officials and was not overly rigid in his views.  
Political constraints, as opposed to advice from officials, were demonstrated to have also 
played a key role in shaping Lange’s view of the foreign policy process. 
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In conclusion, the application of Hermann’s model to Lange and the ANZUS 
demonstrated that Lange had a significant effect on the execution of New Zealand’s a
nuclear policy and the subsequent ANZUS dispute.  His considerable oratorical skills 
enabled New Zealand’s opposition to nuclear weapons to be heard on the world stage.  
He proved to be a superior spokesperson on this issue
dispute has 
nti-
.  However, his general 
anagement of the foreign affairs crisis was lacking in some respects.  In particular, 
 poor management skills.  His keen 
ted 
 be 
l factors 
amework.  Analysing Lange, who operated in a Westminster system of parliamentary 
, 
m
Lange’s handling of the Buchanan affair illustrated his
aversion of conflict and his inability to act decisively at crucial times negatively impac
on the dispute resolution process with Washington.   
 
The Utility of Hermann’s Theoretical Framework 
The application of Hermann’s framework allowed for a wide range of variables to
considered when assessing the influence of a leader’s personality on a particular foreign 
policy executed by their respective government.  The examination of situationa
enabled the political constraints a leader must navigate to be explored, thus enabling 
political leaders from various political systems to be examined under Hermann’s 
fr
government, was possible as Hermann did not limit her model to leaders from 
presidential systems of government.  Key factors in the New Zealand political system
such as the role of cabinet government and public opinion, were able to be addressed. 
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 The personal characteristics Hermann included in the model are also wide ranging.  
Beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style cover a broad collection of 
personal characteristics.  However, this author submits that further characteristics require 
inclusion in this set.  The general management skills a leader possesses are of 
significance as to how they operate in the foreign policy making-process.  A leader with 
trong administrative and organisational skills will approach a foreign policy issue in a 
 
eliefs and motives 
nd the development of their decision style and interpersonal style, this author submits 
at it 
n 
s aptly to the study of David Lange.  His considerable 
telligence is often noted by political commentators.  The manner in which he processed 
 
s
manner different to one who does not.  Whilst decision style and interpersonal style are 
indeed pertinent to such an investigation, they are limited (by Hermann’s definition) to a 
leader’s interaction with other policy-makers and the strategies they employ when 
making a decision.   
 
Second, a leader’s intelligence is not directly addressed by Hermann’s model.  Whilst an
individual’s intelligence will come to bear upon the formation of their b
a
that it is of such importance to how a leader operates in their political environment th
should be independently addressed.  Indeed, the course of action a leader takes is directly 
related to their intellect.  Furthermore, shortcomings, such as lack of training in foreig
affairs, are more pronounced in a leader of more limited intelligence.   
 
Assessment of intellect applie
in
information arguably impacted on the way he managed foreign affairs issues and, in
particular, the ANZUS crisis.  Lange’s ability to comprehend enormous amounts of 
   119
 complex material may have produced a more streamlined foreign policy decision-makin
process. 
 
The third
g 
 set of personal characteristics which Hermann labels “filters” are also of 
ignificance when assessing the affect a leader’s personality has on a particular foreign 
y to their 
 
herefore, it can be argued that Hermann’s theoretical framework effectively 
emonstrates how a leader’s personality can affect the foreign policy behaviour of their 
ation.  Despite two omissions, the variables Hermann utilises are pertinent to a study of 
s nature.  Hermann’s model has enabled David Lange’s personality to be shown to 
ave been a significant element to the ANZUS dispute. 
 
 
 
s
policy.  A leader’s interest in and training in foreign affairs and their sensitivit
environment were demonstrated in the preceding case study to have had a significant 
bearing on the degree to which a leader’s personality can affect the foreign policy of their
nation.   
 
T
d
n
thi
h
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX I 
SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND,
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
 their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and 
NOTING that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed 
e 
n and about Japan to assist in the preservation of 
peace and security in the Japan Area,  
RECOGNIZING that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations have military s outside as well as within the Pacific 
Area,  
 
 their efforts for collective defense for the preservation 
of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of 
regional security in the Pacific Area,  
THEREFORE DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:  
THE PARTIES TO THIS TREATY,  
REAFFIRMING
desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,  
forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative 
responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peac
Treaty may also station armed forces i
 obligation
DESIRING to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential 
aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and 
DESIRING further to coordinate
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 Article I  
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any 
international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manne
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and 
r 
to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.  
 
 
 and 
ack.  
 of any of the Parties is threatened in the 
Pacific.  
Article IV  
 
the 
rdance with its constitutional processes.  
Any such armed attack and all measure esult thereof shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be 
Article V  
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed y of the Parties is deemed to include 
an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island 
 
Article VI  
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights 
and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the 
 
 
Article II  
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately
jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and 
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed att
Article III  
The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet 
common danger in acco
s taken as a r
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and 
maintain international peace and security.  
 attack on an
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or
aircraft in the Pacific.  
   122
 responsibility of the United Nations fo nce of international peace and 
security.  
 
 
e 
 by the United Nations of more effective means to 
maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is 
authorized to maintain a consultative rel ith States, Regional Organizations, 
Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the 
This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as 
possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories 
Article X  
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the 
 to the 
Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the 
eposit of such notice.  
Article XI  
This Treaty in the English language shall be posited in the archives of the Government 
of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the 
Governments of each of the other signatories.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.  
DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.  
r the maintena
Article VII  
The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their 
Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council
should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.  
 
 
Article VIII  
Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in th
Pacific Area and the development
ationship w
purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.  
Article IX  
of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the 
signatories have been deposited. 
Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given
d
de
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w Zealand to the essential process of 
e 
 
 Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
 Ocean floor and in the Subsoil 
f 
e context otherwise requires,—  
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX II 
NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, DISARMAMENT, AND
ARMS CONTROL ACT 1987 
 
  
An Act to establish in New Zealand a Nuclear Free Zone, to promote and encourage 
 active and effective contribution by Nean
disarmament and international arms control, and to implement in New Zealand th
following treaties:   
  
) The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August 1985 (the text of which is set (a
out in Schedule 1 to this Act):   
  
(b) The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
der Water of 5 August 1963 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 2 to this Act):   Un
  
(c) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 (the text of 
which is set out in Schedule 3 to this Act):   
  
(d) The Treaty on the
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the
hereof of 11 February 1971 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 4 to this Act):   T
  
(e) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling o
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 
1972 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 5 to this Act):  
   
1.Short Title—  
This Act may be cited as the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms 
Control Act 1987  
 
2.Interpretation—  
 this Act, unless thIn
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 ``Biological weapon'' means any agent, toxin, weapon, equipment, or means of delivery 
oduction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
t):  
Foreign military aircraft'' means any aircraft, as defined in section 2 of the Defence Act 
bject to the authority or 
ection of the military authorities of any state other than New Zealand:  
, 
Belongs to the armed forces of a state other than New Zealand; and   
 and   
mmunities'', in relation to any ship, aircraft, or crew member, means immunities 
waters of New Zealand'' means the internal waters of New Zealand as defined 
y section 4 of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977:  
device capable 
 releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used, 
embled, or unassembled; but does not include the means of 
apon or device if separable from and not an indivisible 
art of it:  
xcept in as much as these are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary 
n 
rritorial sea of New Zealand as defined by 
ection 3 of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977.   
Act to bind the Crown—  
.New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone—  
referred to in Article 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Pr
their Destruction of 10 April 1972 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 5 to this Ac
   
``
1971, which is for the time being engaged in the service of or su
dir
 ``Foreign warship'' means any ship, as defined in section 2 of the Defence Act 1971
which—   
 
(a)
  
(b)Bears the external marks that distinguishes ships of that state's nationality;
  
(c)Is under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the Government of that 
state; and   
 
(d)Is manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline:  
   
``I
enjoyed under international law by ships, aircraft, or crew members of a class to which 
that ship, aircraft, or crew member belongs:  
   
``Internal 
b
   
``Nuclear explosive device'' means any nuclear weapon or other explosive 
of
whether assembled, partly ass
transport or delivery of such a we
p
   
``Passage'' means continuous and expeditious navigation without stopping or anchoring 
e
by distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships, or aircraft i
distress:  
 
``Territorial sea of New Zealand'' means the te
s
  
3.
This Act shall bind the Crown.   
 
4
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 There is hereby established the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, which shall comprise:   
)The territorial sea of New Zealand; and   
specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this section.   
ition of nuclear explosive devices—    
)No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New 
)Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; 
)Aid, abet, or procure any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over 
 servant or agent of the Crown, shall, beyond the New Zealand 
uclear Free Zone,—   
   
l over 
evices—   
rs, 
on on testing of nuclear explosive devices—  
o person shall test any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.   
n in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.   
.Entry into internal waters of New Zealand—  
 
(a)All of the land, territory, and inland waters within the territorial limits of New 
Zealand; and   
  
(b)The internal waters of New Zealand; and   
 
(c
  
(d)The airspace above the areas 
  
 
Prohibitions in relation to nuclear explosive devices and biological weapons 
5.Prohibition on acquis
(1
Zealand, shall, within the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,—   
 
(a
or   
 
(b
any nuclear explosive device.   
 
(2)No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New 
Zealand, and who is a
N
 
(a)Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; 
or
 
(b)Aid, abet, or procure any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have contro
any nuclear explosive device.   
  
6.Prohibition on stationing of nuclear explosive d
No person shall emplant, emplace, transport on land or inland waters or internal wate
stockpile, store, install, or deploy any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand 
Nuclear Free Zone.  
 
7.Prohibiti
N
  
8.Prohibition of biological weapons—  
No person shall manufacture, station, acquire, or possess, or have control over any 
biological weapo
  
9
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 (1)When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the entry of 
 
ster 
 
 
rs of 
ew Zealand.   
e Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the landing in 
ew Zealand of foreign military aircraft, the Prime Minister shall have regard to all 
 be available to the Prime Minister including 
)The Prime Minister may only grant approval to the landing in New Zealand by any 
ilitary aircraft if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the foreign military aircraft 
en it lands in New Zealand.   
)Any such approval may relate to a category or class of foreign military aircraft, 
 for such period as is specified in the 
pproval.  
ntry into the internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or 
s prohibited.   
othing in this Act shall apply to or be interpreted as limiting the freedom of—   
ny ship exercising the right of innocent passage (in accordance with international 
w) through the territorial sea of New Zealand; or   
)Any ship or aircraft exercising the right of transit passage (in accordance with 
)Any ship or aircraft in distress.   
foreign warships into the internal waters of New Zealand, the Prime Minister shall have
regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime Mini
including information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New
Zealand.   
  
(2)The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal waters of
New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will 
not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal wate
N
  
 
10.Landing in New Zealand—  
(1)When th
N
relevant information and advice that may
information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.   
 
(2
foreign m
will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device wh
  
(3
including foreign military aircraft that are being used to provide logistic support for a 
research programme in Antarctica, and may be given
a
 
11.Visits by nuclear powered ships—  
E
partly dependent on nuclear power i
  
Savings 
12.Passage through territorial sea and straits—   
N
  
(a)A
la
 
(b
international law) through or over any strait used for international navigation; or   
 
(c
  
13.Immunities— 
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as limiting the immunities of—   
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 (a)Any foreign warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purpo
or   
ses; 
)Members of the crew of any ship or aircraft to which paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of 
.Offences and penalties—   
 fails to comply 
)Every person who commits an offence against this Act is liable on conviction on 
t; or   
)The offence of attempting to commit an offence against this Act,—   
 a person alleged to have committed any offence mentioned in this 
 be remanded in custody or on bail, notwithstanding 
at the consent of the Attorney-General to the laying of an information for the offence 
roceedings shall be taken until that 
nquiries as the Attorney-General thinks fit. 
6.Establishment of Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms 
Public Advisory Committee on 
isarmament and Arms Control.   
 fit:   
  
(b)Any foreign military aircraft; or   
 
(c
this section applies.   
 
Offences 
14
(1)Every person commits an offence against this Act who contravenes or
with any provision of sections 5 to 8 of this Act.   
(2
indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.   
 
15.Consent of Attorney-General to proceedings in relation to offences—  
(1)No information shall be laid against any person for—   
  
(a)An offence against this Ac
  
(b)The offence of conspiring to commit an offence against this Act; or   
  
(c
except with the consent of the Attorney-General:   
  
Provided that
subsection may be arrested, or a warrant for any such person's arrest may be issued and 
executed, and any such person may
th
has not been obtained, but no further or other p
consent has been obtained.   
  
(2)The Attorney-General may, before deciding whether or not to give consent under 
subsection (1) of this section, make such i
 
Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control 
1
Control—   
There is hereby established a committee to be called the 
D
 
17.Functions and powers of Committee—  
(1)The functions of the Committee shall be—   
 
(a)To advise the [Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade] on such aspects of disarmament 
and arms control matters as it thinks
   128
   
(b)To advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of this Act:   
d on the implementation of this Act:   
rom such 
nd or funds as may be established for the purpose of promoting greater public 
ably necessary or expedient to 
able it to carry out its functions.  
)One shall be the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, who shall be the 
Eight shall be appointed by the [Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade].   
 shall 
n the instrument of 
pointment, but may from time to time be reappointed.   
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade], or 
ay resign by notice in writing to that Minister.   
its 
.Procedure of Committee—  
], the 
 and travelling expenses—  
)The Committee is hereby declared to be a statutory Board within the meaning of the 
)There shall be paid to the members of the Committee, out of money appropriated by 
d travelling 
llowances and expenses, in accordance with the Fees and Travelling Allowances Act 
pply accordingly.   
d by Parliament for purposes of this Act—  
 
(c)To publish from time to time public reports in relation to disarmament and arms 
control matters an
  
(d)To make such recommendations as it thinks fit for the granting of money f
fu
understanding of disarmament and arms control matters.   
 
(2)The Committee shall have all such powers as are reason
en
18.Membership of Committee—  
(1)The Committee shall consist of 9 members, of whom—   
  
(a
Chairman; and   
 
(b)
  
(2)Each member of the Committee appointed under subsection (1)(b) of this section
be appointed for such term not exceeding 3 years as may be specified i
ap
  
(3)Any such member may be removed from office for incapacity, neglect of duty, or 
misconduct proved to the satisfaction of the [
m
 
(4)The functions and powers of the Committee shall not be affected by any vacancy in 
membership.  
   
19
Subject to any directives given by the [Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Committee may regulate its procedure in such manner as it thinks fit.  
   
20.Remuneration
(1
Fees and Travelling Allowances Act 1951.   
  
(2
Parliament for the purpose, remuneration by way of fees or allowances, an
a
1951, and the provisions of that Act shall a
  
21.Money to be appropriate
   129
 All fees, salaries, allowances, and other expenditure payable or incurred under or in the 
 by Parliament 
endments to Marine Pollution Act 1974 
mendments to Other Acts  
10A.Facilitation of international inspectors under disarmament treaties—   
(a)Confer upon any persons who are appointed as inspectors pursuant to any 
w Zealand is a party 
l or any of the privileges and immunities specified in the Third Schedule to this Act; 
)Make provision (subject to and consistent with any other international obligations 
d commitments binding upon New Zealand) for any such persons so appointed to have 
cess to all such information and to all such places in New Zealand as may be relevant 
 enable those persons to carry out their official duties.''   
.Amendment to Official Information Act 1982—  
he Official Information Act 1982 is hereby amended by inserting in Schedule 1, in its 
ppropriate alphabetical order, the following item:   
Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control''   
.Amendment to Foreign Affairs and Overseas Service Act 1983 (Repealed)—  
 
administration of this Act shall be payable out of money to be appropriated
for the purpose.   
 
Am
22.Interpretation (Repealed)—   
  
23.Application of Part 2 of Marine Pollution Act 1974 (Repealed)—  
 
24.New sections inserted (Repealed)—  
 
25.Permits (Repealed) —    
 
A
26.Amendment to Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968—   
The Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 is hereby amended by inserting, 
after section 10, the following section:  
   
``
 
``The Governor-General may from time to time, by Order in Council,—   
  
``
international agreement on disarmament or arms control to which Ne
al
and   
  
``(b
an
ac
to
  
27
T
a
  
``
  
28
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. How much involvement did you have in the decision-making process with regards 
. With regard to Lange’s unsuccessful attempt to change Labour’s anti-nuclear 
s to his leadership skills?  
with regards to the policy? 
e Tokelaus when the request for the Buchanan was made 
y had already 
in the decision to reject the 
cision style and interpersonal style 
 the anti-nuclear policy when he became 
r time working with Lange how important was Lange’s personality in 
12. What did you perceive as his biggest weakness?  
 
  
 
 
   
 
   
APPENDIX III 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS POSED TO INDIVIDUALS 
INTERVIEWED BY THE AUTHOR 
 
Nature of the situation: decision latitude, definition of situation, participation 
 
1
to the anti-nuclear policy and ANZUS dispute? 
2
policy to allow nuclear propelled ships to enter NZ waters-how did you view this 
move with regard
3. As Prime Minister, did he ever contemplate changing the policy again? 
4. Was he afforded much room to move 
5. In your view, how important was Lange to the anti-nuclear policy of the Fourth 
Labour Government? What role did he play? 
6. Lange was away in th
and it appears that by the time he had returned the Labour Part
decided to reject the visit –how important was Lange 
Buchanan? 
 
Personal characteristics: beliefs, motives, de
 
7. How personally committed was Lange to
Prime Minister? 
8. During you
determining the nuclear ships issue?  
9. How would you describe Lange’s leadership style during his first term as Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs? i.e. interpersonal skills, management 
style, decision style. 
10. How did his particular leadership style impact on your work? 
11. What did you perceive as Lange’s greatest strength? 
   131
 13. How did you perceive his relations were with his other staff and fellow Cabinet
and caucus members in the first term? 
14. Within
 
 Cabinet, to what extent was there a range of views on the anti-nuclear 
our Party 
accurate?  
nship 
 relationship wielded) was a significant factor 
in the anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS issue. To what extent do you agree with 
in the execution of 
 Oxford Union debate. 
 to the anti-nuclear policy? Who was most influential in this 
h America? 
21. 
2. On reflection, did Lange’s holding the Foreign Affairs portfolio help or hinder the 
 affairs whilst Prime Minister? 
4. How widely did he delegate foreign affairs responsibilities? (e.g. What role did 
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank O’Flynn) 
25. To what extent was Lange’s personality suited to the area of foreign affairs? 
26. To what extent was Lange sensitive to the American officials he came in contact 
with during the course of the ANZUS dispute? E.g. H. Munroe Brown, Secretary 
of State George Shultz  
27. From your perspective did Lange enjoy his time as Minister of Foreign Affairs? 
28. Would a different Labour Prime Minister have meant a different outcome on the 
ANZUS issue? (e.g. Geoffrey Palmer, Mike Moore) 
 
N.B. Due to time constraints and in light of the respondents’ particular areas of expertise 
not all questions were asked of every interviewee. 
 
policy? Did Lange take notice of these? 
15. Is Michael Bassett’s view of Lange as captive of the Left of the Lab
16. Former Lange advisor, Chris Laidlaw has stated that Margaret Pope’s relatio
with Lange (and the influence that
this? In your view how important was Pope to the anti-nuclear policy?  
17. How important were Lange’s oratorical and television skills 
the anti-nuclear policy? For example, the
18. To what extent did Lange listen to the advice offered by his staff and MFAT’s 
advisors with regards
area? 
19. How would you assess Lange’s handling of the anti-nuclear policy in the period 
1984-1987, in particular his handling of the dispute wit
 
Filters - personal characteristics: interest in foreign affairs, training in foreign 
affairs and sensitivity to environment  
 
20. In your view, to what extent was Lange was sufficiently versed in the area of 
foreign policy upon assuming the office of Prime Minister? 
How did these skills develop in office? 
2
anti-nuclear policy? 
23. How much time did Lange devote to foreign
2
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